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STATEMENT OF DISCLAIMER 
This project report is a result of a class assignment; it has been graded and accepted as fulfillment of the 
course requirements. Acceptance of this report in fulfillment of the course requirements does not imply 
technical accuracy or reliability. Any use of information in this report is done at the risk of the user. These 
risks may include, but may not be limited to, catastrophic failure of the device or infringement of patent 
or copyright laws. California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo and its staff cannot be held 
liable for any use or misuse of the project.  
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ABSTRACT 
This report contains a prescriptive design analysis and a performance based design analysis for a newly 
constructed United States Air Force 3-Bay Aircraft General Maintenance Hangar and support spaces.  
The prescriptive design analysis reviews the code requirements for fire suppression, fire alarm, life safety, 
and structural fire protection. Additionally, the hydraulic demands of the fire suppression system, and the 
voltage drop and power supply requirements of the fire alarm systems were calculated. The results of the 
analysis portray a compliant prescriptive design of the fire protection systems.  
The performance based design analysis evaluates the hazards in the 3-bay facility for two objectives; Life 
safety and aircraft protection. The life safety objective has been evaluated through an analysis of the 
available safe egress time (ASET) versus the required safe egress time (RSET). The ASET tenability 
limits for this analysis were defined as when the smoke layer would descend to 6 ft above finished floor. 
For this scenario, RSET was determined to be 63% less than ASET. 
The aircraft protection objective was evaluated by modeling the effects of the design fire on the aircraft 
against the known critical heat fluxes of the aircraft coatings. Results from this analysis conclude that the 
performance criteria of the fire suppression systems fail to adequately protect the aircraft from the effects 
of prolonged exposure to incidental radiant heat fluxes for conservative underwing fires. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This report includes a prescriptive design analysis and a performance based design analysis for a recently 
constructed 3-Bay Aircraft General Maintenance Hangar and support spaces. The prescriptive design 
analysis observes the code requirements for fire suppression, fire alarm, life safety, and structural fire 
analysis. The performance based design analysis evaluates the hazards in the 3-bay facility for two 
objectives; Life safety and aircraft protection. The life safety objective has been evaluated through an 
analysis of the available safe egress time (ASET) versus the required safe egress time (RSET). The 
aircraft protection objective is evaluated by comparing the effects of an assumed fire scenario on the 
aircraft against the critical heat flux of the aircraft coatings.  
1.1 Building Description 
This 3-Bay general maintenance hangar is approximately 159,100 Sq. Ft. where each hangar bay is 
approximately 47,500 Sq. Ft. The hangar bays are protected with an overhead wet-pipe automatic 
sprinkler system and supplementary high expansion foam/water deluge systems. The foam/water systems 
for each hangar bay are released individually by a single dedicated releasing panel from either manual 
foam releasing stations or the simultaneous signal from two optical flame detectors. Foam stop/abort 
stations are also provided to halt the flow of foam solution in the event of an inadvertent activation.  
In addition to the three hangar bays, two separate support spaces are provided adjacent to the North side 
of the hangars. Attached support spaces are protected with wet-pipe automatic sprinkler systems. 
A combined fire alarm and mass notification system is provided throughout the entire facility. 
Fire water is provided from two 66,000 gallon above ground dedicated fire water storage tanks located 
just northeast of the facility. Fire water from the storage tanks are fed underground into Fire Protection 
Room 401 where the supply is boosted by two electric fire pumps each rated from 2,500 gpm at 210 psi. 
Additional fire water supply is fed from Room 401 to Room 504 to support additional fire suppression 
risers.  
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this facility is to support the upcoming mission of the KC-46 Pegasus program. The KC-
46 Pegasus is the first phase of a 3-phase effort to replace the U.S. Air Force's aging tanker fleet. With 
more refueling capacity and enhanced capabilities, improved efficiency and increased capabilities for 
cargo and aeromedical evacuation, the KC-46 provides aerial refueling support to the Air Force, Navy, 
Marine Corps as well as allied nation coalition force aircraft. 
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In addition to the design of the aircraft, many major infrastructure upgrades and additions were required 
to accommodate and maintain these new assets. This facility will be able to accommodate the 
simultaneous maintenance procedures for three KC-46 aircraft. Maintenance procedures are primarily 
preventative, rather than corrective, which ensures the equipment is ready and available at the time of 
need.  
Maintenance procedures are classified by AFI 21-101 - Aerospace Equipment Maintenance Management, 
as on-equipment maintenance or off-equipment maintenance. On-equipment work is prepared on the 
aircraft in the hangar bay, while off-equipment maintenance is performed in a repair shop on components 
that are removed during on maintenance procedures. The hangar bays in this facility are capable of 
preparing general on-equipment work and the hydraulic shop and general shops in the support area are 
capable of accommodating general off-equipment maintenance. 
Figure 1-1 below shows a KC-46 performing refueling operations through the rear boom for an F-16 
fighter. 
 
Figure 1-1: Image of KC-46 Pegasus Performing In-Air Refueling Operations 
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1.3 Applicable Codes and Standards 
UFC 1-200-01 requires the use of several codes and standards, primarily the International Building Code 
(IBC), NFPA 101 Life Safety Code, and UFC 3-600-01 Fire Protection Engineering for Facilities. In 
accordance with UFC 1-200-01, the IBC’s focus is on allowable floor area, building height limitations, 
and building separation distance requirements. NFPA 101 is used for building construction related to 
egress and life safety. 
In addition to the codes listed above, ETL 02-15 contains specific requirements regarding the fire 
suppression and fire alarm systems in hangars and the support areas. The following codes and standards 
have been used in this analysis 
International Code Council (ICC) 
IBC  International Building Code, 2012 Edition 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
NFPA 10 Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers, 2013 Edition 
NFPA 11 Standard for Low, Medium, and High Expansion Foam Systems, 2010 Edition 
NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 2013 Edition 
NFPA 20 Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection, 2013 Edition 
NFPA 22 Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire Protection, 2013 Edition 
NFPA 24 Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances, 
2013 Edition 
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code, 2011 Edition 
NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 2013 Edition 
NFPA 80 Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives, 2013 Edition 
NFPA 90A Standard for the Installation of Air-Conditioning and Ventilating Systems, 2012 Edition 
NFPA 101 Life Safety Code, 2012 Edition 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
UFC 1-200-01 General Building Requirements, July 2013 Edition 
UFC 3-600-01 Design: Fire Protection Engineering for Facilities, Change 3, 2013 Edition 
UFC 4-010-01 DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, 2012 Edition 
UFC 4-021-01 Design and O&M: Mass Notification Systems, 2010 Edition 
UFC 4-211-01 DRAFT Aircraft Maintenance Hangars, 95% Draft Pre-Release 
 
U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
ETL 02-15 Fire Protection Engineering Criteria – New Aircraft Facilities, 2002 Edition 
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1.4 Hierarchy of Codes and Standards 
Due to the numerous codes and standards that are applicable to this building analysis, the following figure 
has been created to serve as a visual guide. The codes shown in orange are to be treated as supplemental 
or amendments to codes shown in red. Additionally, NFPA 101 is intended to supplement means of 
egress requirements where specified in the UFC 3-600-01. A visual guide of the code hierarchy is 
presented in Figure 1-2. 
 
Figure 1-2: Hierarchical Flow Chart of Codes and Standards 
 
For example, UFC 1-200-01 specifies the use of UFC 3-600-01 for determining the requirements for fire 
protection systems. However, ETL 02-15 and the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 document are to be used in lieu 
of the UFC 3-600-01 unless otherwise stated.  
The codes and standards listed above will be used in the proceeding section. A complete building code 
analysis in accordance with UFC 1-200-01, UFC-3-600-01, and IBC 2012 has been provided in Section 
2.0.  
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2.0 BUILDING CODE ANALYSIS 
The hangar building footprint is approximately 232 ft x 630 ft, with two 62 ft x ~150 ft wide shop/office 
adjoining single story areas. The structure consists of a 3-bay hangar area with adjoining single story 
structures for squadron operations areas, shops and administration areas. This structure is a custom 
designed steel frame building. 
2.1 Classification of Occupancy  
Per the UFC 1-200-01, the use and occupancy classifications are to be determined in accordance with 
UFC 3-600-01 and Chapter 3 of the 2012 IBC.  The building is a non-separated mixed use S-1 occupancy 
with accessory B/F-1 occupancies per IBC Section 508.2. Table 2-1 below shows the occupancy 
classifications per the IBC as well as NFPA 101. A summary of the occupancy classifications per IBC 
and NFPA 101 is included in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1: Classification of Occupancies 
Occupancy IBC NFPA 101 
Aircraft Hangar Bays 
Storage Group S-1 
Section 311.2 
Industrial – General 
Section 6.1.12, 40.1.1.1.1 
Offices 
Computer Room 
Break Room (< 750 SF) 
Showers/Lockers 
Business Group B 
Section 304.1 
Business 
Section 6.1.11 
Shop 
Mechanical Areas 
Factory Group F-1 
Section 306.2 
Industrial – General 
Section 6.1.12, 40.1.1.1.1 
Tool Crib 
Storage Rooms 
Haz Mat 
Storage Group S-1 
Section 311.2 
Storage – Ordinary 
Section 6.1.13, 6.2.2.3 
Because the primary function and use of this space is active aircraft maintenance procedures, the hangar 
bays have been classified as a primary Group S-1 Occupancy. Because the combined Group B and Group 
F-1 occupancies make up less than 10% of the overall area of the structure, they are considered as 
accessory to the main occupancy. 
Visual representations of the IBC occupancy classifications are included in Figure 2-1, Figure 2-2, and 
Figure 2-3. 
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Figure 2-1: Classification of Occupancies - Entire Facility 
Figure 2-2: Classification of Occupancies - North Support Areas 
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
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Figure 2-3: Classification of Occupancies - South Support Areas 
2.2 Structural Fire Protection  
UFC 3-600-01 Section 2.1.3 requires the use of the IBC for determining the permitted types of 
construction. However, per ETL 02-15 Section A1.1.1, at a minimum, a category Type I or Type II 
Construction shall be utilized. The building construction is Type II-B per the IBC. Table 2-2 below shows 
the rating requirements for various features of an IBC Type II-B building and the actual rating provided. 
A summary of the type of construction required per IBC is included in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2: Type of Construction 
Building Element IBC Type II-B Rating Provided 
Structural Frame 0 hour 0 hour 
Bearing Exterior Wall 0 hour Bearing Walls are not Provided 
Bearing Interior Wall 0 hour Bearing Walls are not Provided 
Non-Bearing Walls Exterior Refer to Building Separation Refer to Building Separation 
Non-Bearing Walls Interior 0 hour* 0 hour* 
Floor Construction Including 
Supporting Beams and Joists 
0 hour* 0 hour* 
Roof Construction Including 
Supporting Beams and Joists 
0 hour 0 hour 
* Except as required for passive fire protection requirements. 
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
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The hangar structure is framed with conventional rolled steel shapes for beams, columns and trusses.  
Because the IBC does not require fire resistance ratings for Type II-B Construction, special protection of 
members has not been provided.  
The structure is supported on spread footings, strip footings and a floor slab at grade. All interior building 
columns are supported on individual or continuous spread footings. Exterior building columns are 
supported on spread footings (individual or continuous) connected with a perimeter grade beam.  The slab 
at grade is a “floating” concrete slab on grade. Slabs supporting aircraft will be designed in accordance 
with airfield pavement methods to accommodate the loading associated with the aircraft. 
The roof has been framed with a metal roof deck over steel open web joists spaced at 2.5 ft to 5.0 ft on 
centers to support a standing seam metal roof.  The joists span approximately 25 ft maximum to the 
trusses or roof support members. 
The exterior wall assembly is constructed of a layer of face brick, separating air space, rigid insulation, 
and a bituminous damp proofing applied to 8” CMU up to 12’-0” above finish floor, and prefinished 
insulated metal panels on horizontal girt are provided above masonry. Interior non-load bearing walls are 
constructed of CMU and in some areas include pre-finished metal panels. 
Overall, the structural design of this facility complies with the requirements of the IBC for a Type II-B 
construction.  
2.3 Building Separation 
UFC 3-600-01 section 2-1.4 requires the IBC for determining the separation distances between buildings. 
In accordance with IBC Table 602, a fire rating is not required where exterior bearing walls, non-bearing 
walls, and unprotected openings are separated by more than 30 feet from other facilities.  
Per ETL 02-15 section A1.1.1.4.2, the minimum separation between an aircraft hangar and other 
buildings is 40 feet.  The 3-bay maintenance hangar facility has no other facility within 40 feet and, 
therefore, the walls or openings are not required to be protected.  
2.4 Area Limitations 
Per UFC 3-600-01 Section 2-1, the allowable area of the building shall be in accordance with the IBC. Per 
ETL 02-15 Section 6, the ETL shall take precedence over UFC 3-600-01. Per ETL 02-15 Section 
A1.1.1.3.1, the allowable floor area of a facility is unlimited when all of the following conditions are met. 
This facility meets these requirements: 
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 The facility is fully sprinklered in accordance with ETL 02-15 
 The water supply to the sprinkler system is in compliance with ETL 02-15 
 The building separation from adjacent structures complies with ETL 02-15 Sections A1.1.4 
though A1.1.4.3. 
 The internal separation walls comply with ETL 02-15 Section A1.1.1.2. 
Because each of these conditions are met, the facility is considered an unlimited area building in 
accordance with ETL 02-15 and IBC Chapter 5. 
2.5 Height Limitations 
Per UFC 3-600-01 section 2-1, the allowable height of the building shall be in accordance with the IBC. 
For the highest roof surface, the peak is 98 feet and the eave is 50 feet. By the definition of building 
height in IBC Section 502.1, the building is 74 feet tall. In accordance with IBC section 504.2, Type II-B, 
Sprinklered construction is limited to 75 feet. The three bay maintenance hangar facility is within the 
height limitation of the IBC. Figure 2-4 shows the south elevation of the hangar bay and the south support 
area.  
Figure 2-4: South Elevation of the South Support Area 
2.6 Occupancy Separation and Passive Fire Protection 
Per ETL 02-15 Section A1.1.1.2.1, all operations outside of the aircraft surfacing area shall be isolated 
from the aircraft servicing area by a masonry wall having a fire resistance rating of one hour. All 
openings in this wall shall be automatic closing or self-closing and shall be automatic closing or self-
closing and shall be rated for at least 45 minutes.  
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
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Per UFC 3-600-01 section 2-1.2, occupancy separation shall be in accordance with IBC Table 508.4. The 
occupancies which exist in the facility are S-1, F-1, and B. Per the IBC, separation is not required 
between these occupancies. 
In accordance with the Air Force Chief Fire Protection Engineer, each bay is considered as a separate fire 
suppression zone and a 3-hour non-masonry barrier is required and provided. Figure 2-5 shows the fire 
rated barriers included in the 3-bay facility. 
Figure 2-5: Occupancy Separation and Passive Fire Protection 
2.7 Additional Fire Separation Requirements 
The fire separation requirements for many of the incidental use areas shown in the table below are 
reduced from 1 hour to 0 hour based on the installation of a fully automatic sprinkler system in the 
building. Additional fire rated separation requirements are presented in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-3: Additional Fire Separation Requirements 
AREA BUILDING AREAS NFPA SOURCE SEPERATIONS 
Corridors All Corridors 0 hour per NFPA 101 
Section 40.3.6 
0 hour 
Hazardous 
Areas 
Mechanical Rooms, 
General Storage 
0 hour per NFPA 101 
Section 40.3.2.4 
0 hour 
Fire Pump Pump/Foam Room 1 hour per NFPA 20 
Table 4.12.1.1.2 
1 hour 
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
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2.8 Passive Fire Protection 
Fire Rated Doors – Door openings are protected per NFPA 80. Doors, frames, and finish hardware are fire 
rated based on the adjacent wall rating and NFPA 101 Table 8.3.4.2 
Fire dampers are rated for at least 45 minutes are provided for all openings (i.e. duct penetrations and air 
transfer openings) in the 1- hour fire rated barrier separating the aircraft servicing area from the support 
areas in accordance with ETL 02-15 section A1.1.1.2.1.  
Fire dampers are not provided in penetrations though the 1 hour rated barriers of the Pump/Foam Room 
or the Haz Mat Room. Per NFPA 90A section 5.3.1.1, fire dampers are not required in ducts in walls that 
have a fire resistance rating less than 2 hours. Fire dampers are provided in all air transfer openings 
through partitions required to have a fire resistance rating in accordance with NFPA 90A section 5.3.1.2. 
2.9 Building Code Summary 
The preceding analysis highlighted the requirements per the building code for type of construction, 
allowable height and area, passive fire protection, and smoke management systems. The following section 
addresses the life safety components which depend largely on the selected classifications of the building 
code analysis.   
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3.0 LIFE SAFETY ANALYSIS 
3.1 Occupant Load 
Per the UFC 3-600-01, the means of egress is to comply with NFPA 101. Occupant Load is calculated in 
accordance with NFPA 101 Table 7.3.1.2 utilizing the occupant load factor for each usage of space. For 
the purposes of occupant loading, the usage of the space can be different than the occupancy 
classification. For example, classrooms in a Business occupancy are not classified as an Educational or 
Assembly occupancy, although the use from Table 7.3.1.2 most closely resembles an Education 
classroom.  
Table 3-1 includes the relevant occupant load factors per NFPA 101 Table 7.3.1.2. 
Table 3-1: Occupant Load Factors 
Area Type/Use (NFPA 101) Occupant Load Factor 
Industrial Use 100 SF/Person 
Business Use 100 SF/Person 
Assembly Less Concentrated (Without Fixed Seating) 15 SF/Person 
Storage Use 500 SF/Person 
If the use of any space is to change in the future, a new analysis of the building egress is required. The 
building occupant load for the current configuration is shown in Table 3-2.  
Table 3-2: Building Occupant Load 
Level 
Floor 
Area 
(SF) 
Areas Use Type 
Area 
(SF) 
Occ. 
Load 
Factor 
Persons Total 
Main 
Level 
Hangar Bays, 
Shops 
Storage 500 308 
367 
Offices Business 100 30 
Break Room 
Assembly 
(less conc.) 
15 25 
Storage Rooms, 
Haz Mat, Tool 
Crib 
Storage 500 4 
Total 158,893     367 
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3.2 Arrangement of Exits 
The arrangement of exits within the building have been located in accordance with NFPA 101 Section 
7.5.1.3.3. Since the building is protected throughout by an approved, supervised, automatic sprinkler 
system in accordance with Section 9.1, the minimum separation distance between exits or exit access 
doors shall not be less than one-third the length of the maximum overall diagonal dimension of the 
building or area to be served.  
Per NFPA 101 Section 7.5.2.1, access to an exit shall not be through kitchens, storerooms, restrooms, or 
workrooms. Additionally, access to the exit shall not be though a room subject to being locked. Per NFPA 
101 Section 7.5.1.6, exit access shall not be through a room of higher hazard. 
Per NFPA 101 Section 40.6.1.2, exits in hangars are provided not exceeding 150ft along the exterior 
walls. Dwarf or smash doors are permitted in the aircraft accommodating doors in lieu of exit doors 
complying with the normal code requirements of exit doors per NFPA 101 Section 40.6.1.4.   
The exits provided in the support areas are in compliance with the requirements listed. The exits provided 
in the hangar bay are also in compliance with the requirements of NFPA 101 Section 40.6.1.4. 
3.3 Number of Exits 
Per NFPA 101 section 7.4.1.1, the number of means of egress from a story shall not be less than two. In 
accordance with NFPA 101 Section 7.4.1.2, where the occupant load is more than 1,000, not less than 4 
exits from the building are required.  
Per NFPA 101 Section 40.2.4.1.2, a single means of egress shall be permitted from any story or section in 
a low or ordinary hazard industrial occupancies, provided that the exit can be reached within the distance 
permitted as a common path of travel. This requirement applies to many or the smaller occupied rooms in 
the support spaces.  
3.4 Common Path, Dead-End, and Travel Distance Limit 
The common path of travel, dead end corridors, and maximum travel distance are shown below for 
sprinklered facilities in accordance with Table A.7.6 of NFPA 101.  
Table 3-3: Common Path, Dead End, and Travel Distances 
Type of Use Common Path Limit Dead End Limit Travel Distance Limit 
Industrial 
General 
100 ft 50 ft 250 ft 
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Each hangar bay is in compliance with the requirements of NFPA 101. In all areas of the hangar bays, the 
common path of travel is 0 ft because at any point, occupants have the choice between at least 2 paths of 
travel. Additionally, within the hangar bays, an exit is well within the 250 ft. travel distance limitation. 
No dead end corridors are present in the hangar bays.  
Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 below demonstrate the compliance of the support spaces with Table A.7.6 of 
NFPA 101. Overall, the greatest common path distance in either of the support spaces is 30 ft. This is 
within the acceptable limit defined by NFPA 101 and is compliant.  
Figure 3-1: Common Path and Travel Distances - North Support Areas 
 
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
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Figure 3-2: Common Path and Travel Distances - South Support Areas 
3.5 Minimum Exit Widths 
The egress capacity has been designed in accordance with NFPA 101 Sections 7.2 and 7.3. Table 3-4 
below includes the egress capacity factors by component as specified by NFPA 101. 
Table 3-4: Egress Capacity Factors by Component 
Component Requirement NFPA 101 
Doors in Exit Path Minimum 32 Inch Clear Section 7.2.1.2.3.2 
Corridor Minimum 36 Inch Clear Section 7.3.4.1 
Level Components 0.2 Inches per Person Section 7.3.3.1 
All doorways in the means of egress meet the requirements of NFPA 101 Section 7.2 and all exit 
corridors meet the requirements of NFPA 101 Section 7.3. 
Per the occupant load calculations determined in Section 3.1, the required egress width was determined. 
The provided egress width exceeds the required egress width in accordance with NFPA 101. The 
comparison is shown below in Table 3-5. 
Table 3-5: Egress Capacity Validation 
Level Area Requirement Occupant Load Required Width Provided Width 
Main Level All 0.2 inches per person 367 persons 74 inches 1,258 inches 
  
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
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4.0 OTHER LIFE SAFETY SPECIALTIES 
4.1 Smoke Management 
Smoke management in this facility is passive. Per NFPA 101, smoke/heat vents, smoke control systems, 
or smoke barriers are not required for Industrial, Storage, and Business occupancies in an aircraft hangar. 
To mitigate the propagation of smoke, upon any general fire alarm within the facility, the fire alarm 
control panel de-energizes the air handling equipment.  
Ceiling spaces are all un-sprinklered noncombustible areas, and therefore, do not require draft stops. 
Some office partitions extend up to the structure above, which devices the ceiling spaces into smaller 
areas, thereby providing some inherent smoke compartmentalization.  
Draft curtains are provided in the Hangar Bays in accordance with ETL 02-15 Section A1.1.1.5. Draft 
curtains shall be divided into spaces not exceeding 15,000 SF. The depth of the draft curtains shall be a 
minimum of 1/8th the height of the hangar bay or the bottom of the lowest structural member, whichever 
is lower. For the hangar bays in this facility, the draft curtains extend to a depth of 12 ft. from the hangar 
bay ceiling.  
Figure 4-1: Passive Smoke Control - Location of Draft Curtains 
 
This figure is not releasable in accordance
with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or
commercial or financial information that a
DOD component receives from a person or
organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record
will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary
handling of such records.
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The draft curtains provided in this hangar are intended to expedite sprinkler activation times where 
possibly hindered by the effects of the high ceiling. Traditionally, draft curtains were included in hangars 
with high ceilings to allow faster operation of sprinklers by containing the hot gas layer in compartments. 
Because of this, additional passive smoke management equipment, such as smoke vents, have not been 
provided.  
In reality, the presence of draft hangars has the ability to hinder the performance of the sprinkler systems 
or ceiling mounted heat detection. If a fire is located directly underneath the draft curtain, the hot gasses 
in the smoke plume can be divided, allowing for an increased activation time. This also allows for a fire 
to continue to grow to a potentially uncontrollable size before suppression can initiate. Because this 
facility is included with a high expansion foam system initiated by optical flame detectors, the draft 
curtains could be viewed by some engineers as not mission critical.  
4.2 Fire Extinguishers 
Fire extinguishers and cabinets are included in this design. The location, type, and size of extinguishers 
are indicated on the life safety drawings as shown in the figures below. In accordance with UFC 3-600-01 
Section 4-9, portable fire extinguishers shall be installed as required by NFPA 101 and classified in 
accordance with NFPA 10 Table 6.2.1.1.  
Table 4-1: Fire Extinguisher Installation Requirements Summary 
Area 
Fire 
Classifications 
Hazard 
Classification 
Maximum 
Travel 
Distance 
Maximum 
Floor Area Per 
Unit of A 
Extinguisher 
Rating / Agent 
Provided 
General 
Industrial 
Support 
A/B/C Light Hazard 75 ft. 3,000 SF 
2A:20B:C 
Multi-Purpose Dry 
Chemical 
Hangar Bay A/B/C Light Hazard 50 ft. 1,000 SF 
4A:40B:C 
Multi-Purpose Dry 
Chemical 
Fire extinguishers within the hangar bays will be spaced along the walls at a maximum of 50 ft. on center. 
For those areas within the hangar bays in which the travel distance exceeds 50 ft., typically, the user will 
be responsible for providing additional fire extinguishers that support the aircraft. Plans showing the 
location and configuration of fire extinguishers are included in Figure 4-2, Figure 4-3, and Figure 4-4. 
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Figure 4-2: Fire Extinguisher Locations - Hangar Bay 3 
Figure 4-3: Fire Extinguisher Locations – North Support Area 
 
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
This figure is not releasable in accordance with
FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption (b)(4)
refers to those trade secrets or commercial or
financial information that a DOD component
receives from a person or organization outside
the Government with the understanding that the
information or record will be retained on a
privileged or confidential basis in accordance
with the customary handling of such records.
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Figure 4-4: Fire Extinguisher Locations – South Support Areas 
 
4.3 Emergency Lighting and Exiting 
Emergency lighting and exit signage is provided along the means of egress as required by NFPA 101, in 
accordance with the occupancy. 
4.4 Interior Finish Ratings 
In accordance with UFC 3-600-01 Section 2-6.1, interior wall and ceiling finishes including movable 
partitions shall conform to the requirements of NFPA 101. The following table is a compilation of the 
requirements for interior finishes in accordance with NFPA 101 Table A.10.2.2. Per NFPA 101 Section 
10.2.8.1, where an approved automatic sprinkler system is installed, interior wall and ceiling finish with a 
flame spread rating not exceeding Class C is permitted to be used in any location where Class B is 
required, and with a rating of Class B in any location where Class A is required.  
Table 4-2 includes the reduction in finish ratings allowed for sprinklered buildings per NFPA 101.  
Table 4-2: Interior Finish Ratings Summary 
Occupancy (NFPA 101) Exits Exit Access Corridors Other Spaces 
Industrial Class C Class C Class C 
Exit Enclosures Class B Class C Class C 
4.5 Life Safety Summary 
In summary, the facility complies with the life safety requirements of UFC 3-600-01 and NFPA 101. In 
addition to passive life safety measures, the active fire suppression systems installed in this facility are 
also included and described in the following section.   
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
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5.0 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS 
5.1 Fire Suppression Requirements 
The facility is completely protected by a hydraulically designed automatic sprinkler system in accordance 
with UFC 3-600-01. The concealed spaces above suspended ceilings are not provided with sprinklers 
because these spaces are noncombustible.  
The Hangar support areas are provided with wet-pipe sprinkler systems. The hangar bays are protected 
with a low-level high expansion foam deluge system in accordance with ETL 02-15 section A1.3.3 and a 
wet-pipe system in accordance with A1.3.2.1 with a temperature monitoring system in accordance with 
ETL 02-15 Section A1.5.4. The design accommodates the parking arrangement of KC-46 aircraft. 
The type of sprinkler systems for the hangar bays were determined in accordance with ETL 02-15 and is 
dependent on the recorded 99.6% Dry-Bulb Temperature as recorded on the Engineering Weather Data 
Sheets published by the NOAA. According to ETL 02-15 Section A1.3.2.1 a wet-pipe sprinkler system is 
to be used in the aircraft servicing areas in geographic locations having a 99.6% Dry-bulb temperature 
greater than 0 Deg F. For this location, the 99.6% Dry Bulb is 4 Deg F and wet-pipe sprinkler systems 
have been installed in the hangar bays. For more information on the Engineering Weather Datasheet for 
this Air Force Installation, Refer to Appendix E. 
There are two fire protection rooms provided in this facility; Room 401 and Room 504. Room 401 serves 
as the primary fire protection room while Room 504 is remotely located to meet the high expansion foam 
delivery criteria for Hangar Bay 1. 
Fire Protection Room 401 includes the buildings two fire pumps and corresponding jockey pump, foam 
induction equipment, fire alarm and suppression releasing panels, and a riser manifold with wet-pipe and 
foam/water risers serving the East support areas and Hangar Bays 2 and 3. A detailed plan view of Room 
401 is included in Figure 5-1. 
Fire water is fed from downstream of the fire pumps to Fire Protection Room 504 which includes a riser 
manifold with wet-pipe and foam/water risers serving the West support areas and Hangar Bay 1.  
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Figure 5-1: Detailed Layout of Fire Protection Room 401 
5.2 Water Supply 
The water supply for the fire protection systems in this facility is provided from two above ground 
dedicated fire water storage tanks. The requirements for the fire water supply is given in ETL 02-15 Sec. 
1.4.4. Per the code, the base domestic water system is to be used whenever adequate capacity in terms of 
flow rate, pressure, and storage capacity is available.  
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
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Fire Hydrants are provided in accordance with UFC 3-600-01. Section 3-7.3.3 requires that a sufficient 
number of hydrants must be provided so that the fire flow demand can be met without taking more than 
1,250 gpm from any single hydrant. While the UFC 3-600-01 provides hydrant quantity and flow 
requirements, the ETL 02-15 provides location requirements for fire hydrants. Per the ETL, hydrants 
protecting aircraft hangars are required to be installed at 300 ft. maximum intervals, and there will be at 
least one hydrant within 30 meters of each corner of the hangar. Fire hydrants are required to be supplied 
from the domestic (potable) water system around the hangar and not fed from the hangar fire protection 
water system.  
The hydrants provided around the 3-bay hangar meet the criteria of UFC 3-600-01 and ETL 02-15. A map 
of the hydrant locations is included in Figure 5-2 below. Additionally, a summary of the flow test results 
from these hydrants shown above are provided in Table 5-1: 
 
Figure 5-2: Site Hydrant Map 
Table 5-1: Hydrant Flow Test Summary Data 
Hydrant  Location Static (PSI) Residual (PSI) Flow Rate (GPM) 
FH1168 NW Corner 80 60 1271 
FH1167 SW Corner 80 60 1271 
FH1114 NE Corner 88 60 1271 
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
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The fire water demand for a simultaneous flow of the hangar bay sprinkler system and the low level high 
expansion foam systems would exceed the provided fire water supply. Therefore, it has been concluded 
the water supply available to this facility is inadequate for the system demand, and dedicated water 
storage tanks sized in accordance with ETL 02-15 are required.  
Water is fed from Fire protection room 401 to Fire protection room 504. Additionally, the fire water 
supply is fed back underground to be used for additional base hangar projects that will occur as part of a 
separate construction phase. The fire water demands of the 3-bay hangar are greater than the requirements 
of the other hangars to be constructed, therefore, the provided supply will be adequate for the additional 
buildings without the upsizing of the fire water tanks in the future.  
5.2.1 Fire Water Storage Tanks 
To meet the fire water demands of the fire protection systems, two above ground, dedicated fire water 
storage tanks have been provided. The required volume of water is determined in accordance with the 
means provided in ETL 02-15. Section A1.4.2.3 requires that the provided storage capacity is equal to 
120 percent of the maximum demand for 30 minutes. Additionally, the ETL requirements state that the 
required storage capacity shall be divided between two equal-sized water tanks, each storing one half the 
required volume. The piping configuration must allow water to be supplied by both reservoirs if the other 
is out of service.  
Per the requirements of ETL 02-15, two 66,000 gallon storage tanks are provided. The full water supply 
analysis is included in Appendix B and a summary of the results are shown in Table 5-2.  
Table 5-2: Fire Water Supply Calculation Summary 
Discharge Duration 30 min 
Calculated Rate Water/Concentrate 2,873 gpm 
Total Estimated Volume of Water (Flow*Duration) 86,190 gal 
20% Increase per ETL 02-15 103,428 gal 
Size of Each Tank Required (2 Tanks) 51,714 gal 
Size of Each Tank Provided (2 Tanks) 66,000 gal 
As required by the ETL 02-15, all fire water storage tanks are to be provided with a low-water-level alarm 
and a low-temperature alarm, each transmitting back to the fire department as separate supervisory 
signals. External visual water level gauges and automatic refill from the base water distribution system is 
also required to be provided on each storage tank. Due to the geographical location of this Air Force Base, 
additional freeze protection measures are required per ETL 02-15 Section A1.4.2.4.  
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The fire water storage tanks are refilled via the domestic water line. A reduced pressure zone backflow 
preventer is provided at the transition point between the domestic potable line and the dedicated fire 
suppression line.  
Per AFCEC directives, storage tanks shall be completely insulated. Insulation and heat trace systems shall 
be provided on all above ground supply piping to and from the storage tanks to a depth no less than the 
frost line.  
5.3 Fire Pumps 
The water pressure and flow requirements of the automatic sprinkler systems and high expansion foam 
systems dictate the installation of fire pumps for this hangar. Per ETL 02-15, fire water pump systems are 
to be installed in accordance with NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Stationary Fire Pumps for 
Fire Protection.  
The fire pumps for this facility are located in Fire Protection Room 401. ETL 02-15 requires the 
installation of a redundant pump and a pressure maintenance pump (jockey pump). The fire pumps are 
configured in parallel to maintain operations when the redundancy is needed. A summary of the rated Fire 
pump characteristics are included in Table 5-3. 
Table 5-3: Fire Pump Characteristics Summary 
Fire Pump Pump Type  Flow Rate (gpm) Total Head (psi) Horsepower 
Fire Pump 1 Horizontal Split Case 2,500 215 50 
Fire Pump 2 Horizontal Split Case 2,500 215 50 
Jockey Pump Multi-State Centrifugal 25 135 10 
Additionally, the requirements state that a single water pumping station shall be designed to 
accommodate multiple aircraft facilities when practical. Because this building is a part of the first phase 
of a 3-phase infrastructure upgrade plan, the pumps in this facility will be used to supply the fire water 
demands of two other hangars to be constructed in the future. Because the fire water demands of the 3-
bay hangar are greater than the demands of the additional hangars to be constructed, the pumps provided 
are adequate to support the future fire protection systems in the other buildings.  
Pumps are controlled by electric Soft-start controllers. The intent behind a soft start fire pump controller 
is to allow for gradual increases and decreases in system flow and pressure to mitigate the effects of water 
hammer. When both the pre-action systems and the high expansion foam systems for a hangar bay 
operate, a sudden surge in water flow occurs and can be attributed to the wear and tear of piping 
networks. 
Culminating Experience In Fire Protection Final 3-Bay Aircraft General Maintenance Hangar 
 
FPE-596 5-25 Z. Ataiyan 
 
5.4 Automatic Fire Sprinkler Systems 
Section 4-2.2 of the UFC 3-600-01 requires the installation of complete automatic sprinkler protection 
throughout all new DoD facilities. The sprinkler systems are to be designed in accordance with the 
Area/Density method of NFPA 13, except the design densities, design area, hose stream allowance, and 
duration of supply requirements must be in accordance with FM Global Datasheet 3-26, Fire Water 
Demand for Non-Storage Sprinklered Facilities Tables 1 through 4, including the revised Table 2 in FM 
Engineering bulletin. The densities of the automatic sprinkler systems have been summarized in Table 
5-4. 
Table 5-4: Automatic Fire Sprinkler Design Density Summary 
Hazard Classification 
System 
Type 
Density 
(GPM/SF) 
Remote 
Area (SF) 
Area Per 
Head (SF) 
Temperature 
Rating 
Light Hazard (HC-1) Wet 0.10 1,500 225 175 F  
Ordinary Hazard (HC-2) Wet 0.20 2,500 110 200 F 
Hangar Bay (ETL 02-15) Wet 0.20 5,000 110 200 F 
Wet-pipe risers have been installed for each sprinkler system. Each riser installed follows a typical design 
with differing pipe and riser diameters depending on the system demands. The typical wet-pipe riser 
detail utilized in this facility is shown in Figure 5-3. 
 
Figure 5-3: Typical Wet-Pipe Sprinkler System Riser 
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The components shown in the riser detail above are intentionally included. The most notable component 
in this riser is the pressure reducing valve set to a maximum of 160 psi. Because each of the risers are fed 
off of a single riser manifold, the pressure demands of the foam/water systems exceed the pressure ratings 
of the wet-pipe sprinkler pipe, and therefore, a means of regulating the sprinkler system pressure is 
required. In addition to the pressure regulating valve, a 10-gallon hydraulic surge arrestor has been 
provided to reduce the effects of water surges and prevent water hammer.  
5.4.1 Support Area Sprinkler Protection 
Both the East and West support areas are provided with automatic wet-pipe sprinkler systems in 
accordance with UFC 3-600-01. The sprinkler systems in each support area are fed from individual wet-
pipe sprinkler risers located in Room 504 and Room 401 for the West and East support areas, 
respectively.  
The sprinkler densities used to protect each area in the support spaces have been determined depending on 
the classification of the hazards in the space. Light hazard areas including, but not limited to the 
break/training room, offices, computer room, and toilets have been protected with a HC-1 sprinkler 
density while all shops, testing rooms, Hazmat, and mechanical and storage spaces have been protected 
with a HC-2 sprinkler density.  
The differences in densities account for the volume of water that would be required in a fire event in that 
space. The provided density for HC-1 assumes that for a light hazard space, a potential fire could be 
controlled within an area of 1,500 SF, while a HC-2 density assumes that potential fires in that space 
could be reasonably controlled by sprinklers within 2,500 SF. Sprinkler density classifications for each 
support areas are shown in Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5. 
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Figure 5-4: Sprinkler Density Classification for West Support Areas 
 
Figure 5-5: Sprinkler Density Classification for East Support Areas 
 
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption
(b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DOD
component receives from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential
basis in accordance with the customary handling of such records.
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Prior to compiling hydraulic calculations, specific sprinklers were selected based on design density and 
area conditions. A summary of the selected sprinkler details are listed below: 
Light Hazard (HC-1) Areas 
 Max Coverage per Head: 225 SF 
 Density:   0.10 gpm/sf over 1,500 sf  
 Sprinkler:   Reliable Mod F1FR56 QR. Std. Recessed Pendant 
 Temperature Rating:  175 Deg F  
Finish:    Chrome 
Orifice:    1/2” 
 K-Factor:   5.6 
Ordinary Hazard (HC-2) Areas 
 Max Coverage per Head: 110 SF (130 SF per ETL 02-15) 
 Density:   0.10 gpm/sf over 1,500 sf  
 Sprinkler(s):   Reliable Mod F1FR LO QR Std. Upright & Pendant models 
 Temperature Rating:  200 Deg F  
Finish:    Brass 
Orifice:    3/4” 
 K-Factor:   8.0  
A full set of sprinkler contractor shop drawings have been provided. In the contractors design, a cross-
main sprinkler layout is utilized. Hydraulic calculations for the systems have been provided for the 
hydraulically most demanding remote area for each support area. A summary of the Hydraulic demands 
are included in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-5: Support Area Risers Hydraulic Demand Summary 
Riser Location Size Flow at BOR Pressure at BOR Type 
East Support Area FP Room 401 4” 118 psi 600 gpm Wet 
West Support Area FP Room 504  4” 99 psi 662 gpm Wet 
Comparing the hydraulic demand for the most demanding support area system to the supply via the pump 
curve demonstrates that the system will contain adequate water supply for the systems. The most 
demanding hangar bay sprinkler system is shown below in Figure 5-6. 
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Figure 5-6: Hydraulic Supply and Demand Curve For Support Area Sprinkler System 
5.4.2 Hangar Bay Sprinkler Protection 
Each hangar bay is provided with an automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system in accordance with ETL 02-15 
Section A1.3. Because this 3-bay maintenance hangar will be used for fueled aircraft operation, each 
sprinkler system riser is to be hydraulically designed as capable of providing 0.2 gpm/SF over the most 
remote 5,000 SF in addition to low-level high expansion foam system.  
The sprinkler systems in each hangar bay are fed from individual wet-pipe sprinkler risers located in 
Room 401 for Hangar Bays 2 and 3, and Room 504 for Hangar Bay 1. 
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Figure 5-7: Sprinkler Density Classification for Hangar Bays 
Prior to compiling hydraulic calculations, specific sprinklers were selected based on the required design 
density and area conditions. A summary of the selected sprinkler details are listed below: 
Hangar Bay (ETL 02-15) 
 Max Coverage per Head: 110 SF 
 Density:   0.20 gpm/SF over 5,000 SF  
 Sprinkler:   Reliable Mod F1FR56 QR Std. Upright 
 Temperature Rating:  200 Deg F  
Finish:    Brass 
Orifice:    1/2” 
 K-Factor:   5.6 
A full set of sprinkler contractor shop drawings have been provided. In the contractor’s design, a gridded 
sprinkler layout is utilized in each hangar. Hydraulic calculations for the systems have been provided for 
the hydraulically most demanding remote area for each hangar bay. A summary of the Hydraulic demands 
are included in Table 5-6. 
This figure is not releasable in accordance with FOLA exemption
(b)(4). FOIA exemption (b)(4) refers to those trade secrets or
commercial or financial information that a DOD component receives
from a person or organization outside the Government with the
understanding that the information or record will be retained on a
privileged or confidential basis in accordance with the customary
handling of such records.
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Table 5-6: Hangar Bay Risers Hydraulic Demand Summary 
Riser Location Size Flow Demand at BOR Pressure Demand at BOR Type 
Hangar Bay 1 FP Room 504 6” 1,240 gpm 193 psi Wet 
Hangar Bay 2 FP Room 401 6” 1,299 gpm 188 psi Wet 
Hangar Bay 3 FP Room 401 6” 1,228 gpm 198 psi Wet 
Comparing the hydraulic demand for the most demanding hangar bay system to the supply via the pump 
curve demonstrates that the system will contain adequate water supply for the systems. The most 
demanding hangar bay sprinkler system is shown below in Figure 5-8.  
  
Figure 5-8: Hydraulic Supply and Demand Curve For Hangar Sprinkler Systems 
5.5 High Expansion Foam/Water Deluge System 
As required by ETL 02-15, areas used for fueled aircraft are to be protected with a low-level high 
expansion foam system designed in accordance with NFPA 11A Standard for Medium and High 
Expansion Foam Systems. For this project, the Air Force has included the Draft UFC 4-211-01 as an 
applicable standard for the design of the foam/water systems.  
High expansion foam is used because it effectively combats the hazards associated with hydrocarbon pool 
fires. High expansion foam is able to expand and provide coverage over the surface of a fuel spill fire. 
This spreading smothers the flames preventing oxygen from reaching the fire. The mass of the foam 
maintains an oxygen deficient area until the fire is suppressed.  
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Additionally, as the foam smothers a fire, steam is generated as a result of the radiant heat from the fire, 
causing heat removal from the fire via evaporation.  This mechanism provides a cooling component and 
creates an ambient steam-air mixture significantly below the required oxygen level to support continued 
combustion.  
Finally, the high expansion foam provides a cooling effect of the fuel via the foam bubbles breaking and 
releasing water onto the hot surfaces. This mechanism allows for more effective penetration into burning 
materials and provides cooling to the burning material to below its ignition temperature. 
The ETL 02-15 and the UFC 4-211-01 share identical foam calculation methods and performance criteria 
for foam systems. Where the UFC 4-211-01 differs is with respect to the methods in which the foam 
concentrate is proportioned with water to create foam solution. Where traditional foam water risers use a 
foam proportioning system with a ratio controller and a pressurized bladder foam concentrate tank, the 
UFC 4-211-01 requires a foam induction system with atmospheric foam concentrate tanks. This has 
various implications on the design and increases the required pressure necessary for the system to operate 
as intended.  
Each hangar bay is considered as a separate fire suppression zone and has been separated from other 
hangar bays by a 3-hour non-masonry fire rated barrier at the request of the Air Force Chief Fire 
Protection Engineer. Each fire suppression zone is fed by an individual foam/water flow control riser and 
is initiated in accordance with the methods discussed in Section 6.2. 
The performance criteria of the low-level high expansion foam system is given in ETL 02-15 Section 
A1.3.3.2. Per the performance criteria, at one minute after foam activation the released foam solution 
must cover 90 percent of the aircraft silhouette area projected on the floor. At four minutes, the released 
foam solution must cover the entire aircraft servicing area to a depth of one meter (3.2 feet).  
5.5.1 Foam/Water System Risers 
A total of three foam/water risers are provided in this facility, where each of the three hangar bays are 
served by a dedicated riser. The foam/water riser for Hangar Bay 1 is located in Fire Protection room 504 
while the foam/water risers for Hangar Bays 2 and 3 are located in Fire Protection Room 401.   
Given the ETL 02-15 performance criteria of foam coverage of 90 percent of the projected aircraft 
silhouette in one minute or less, it was determined thorough theoretical analysis that a foam/water riser 
located in Room 401 would not satisfy the design requirements for Hangar Bay 1. It was determined that 
the most cost effective solution to this issue was to provide an additional riser room located near Hangar 
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Bay 1. This solution reduced the overall pipe length required from the foam/water risers to the generators 
in Hangar Bay 1 and, in turn, allowed the performance criteria of ETL 02-15 to be satisfied.    
Where traditional foam/water risers have utilized conventional deluge valves, the UFC 4-211-01 requires 
the use of flow control valves. Flow control valves are deluge valves utilizing a unique trim piping 
package that allows for greater functionality. One component of the included trim assembly is for the 
pressure and flow through the valve to be controlled, ensuring proper operation and proportioning through 
the inductor nozzle. For a solenoid to reclose the deluge clapper upon a stop-foam signal. The typical 
foam/water riser detail utilized in this facility is shown in Figure 5-9. 
 
Figure 5-9: Typical Foam/Water Riser Layout 
A full set of foam system contractor shop drawings have been provided. In the contractor’s design, each 
foam/water riser feeds eight (8) Foam generators. Hydraulic calculations for the systems have been 
provided for each hangar bay. A summary of the Hydraulic demands are included in Table 5-7. 
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Table 5-7: Hangar Bay Foam/Water Risers Hydraulic Demand Summary 
Riser Location Size 
Flow Demand at 
BOR 
Pressure Demand 
at BOR 
Type 
Hangar Bay 1 FP Room 504 8” 1,586 gpm 193 psi Foam 
Hangar Bay 2 FP Room 401 8” 1,581 gpm 188 psi Foam 
Hangar Bay 3 FP Room 401 8” 1,581 gpm 198 psi Foam 
Comparing the hydraulic demand for the most demanding hangar bay foam system to the water supply via 
the pump curve demonstrates that the system will contain adequate water supply for the systems. The 
most demanding hangar bay sprinkler system is shown below in Figure 5-10. 
 
Figure 5-10: Hydraulic Supply and Demand Curve For Hangar Bay 1 Foam System 
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5.5.2 Foam Induction System 
Included in the various changes in the UFC 4-211-01 document is the introduction of inducted foam 
systems for Air Force high expansion foam systems. In an inducted foam system, an inductor is used 
instead of a commonly used ratio controller proportioning system paired with a pressurized foam bladder 
tank.  
A foam inductor works by utilizing a venturi nozzle to induct foam concentrate from an atmospheric 
concentrate tank into the water line, creating foam solution. The following figure will be used to illustrate 
the function of the nozzle. A diagram of a venture nozzle is included in Figure 5-11.  
 
Figure 5-11: Venturi Nozzle Section View Diagram 
As the water flows upwards through the riser, the velocity of the water is increased as it passes through 
the inductor. This increase in pressure creates a low pressure zone at the narrowest part of the nozzle, 
which inducts the foam through the suction line from the foam concentrate storage tank. As the foam 
concentrate is inducted, it mixes at the pre-defined concentration by percentage and the solution flows out 
of the inductor assembly though the foam/water system piping to the foam generators.  
While the inductor nozzle utilizes fluid mechanics laws to mix and create the foam solution, there are 
several challenges that must be considered to ensure the system inducts the foam properly. First, the 
inductor nozzle diameter is fabricated by the manufacturer prior to installation and is not adjustable. 
Because of this, a great detail of coordination is required between the inductor manufacturer and the 
system designer. To maintain the proper foam concentration in the solution, the water pressure and 
velocity though the inductor must be held constant. To achieve this, a flow control riser is utilized that 
controls the flow through the inductor to insure proper foam induction.  
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Another challenge of the inductor is that the venturi nozzle can create a large pressure drop. To account 
for this loss while ensuring the proper flow and pressure is available, fire pumps have been provided. 
For these foam systems, a Fomtec between-flange Z-inductor (BFZ) has been installed. Per the hydraulic 
calculations for the foam system, the inductor causes a pressure drop range of 73 to 78 psi for each foam 
riser. The inductors are installed between a minimum 10 pipe diameters of straight pipe in this facility as 
required per the UFC 4-211-01. Figure 5-12 below includes an image of the Fomtec BFZ 6” Inductor.  
 
`
 
Figure 5-12: Images of Fomtec BFZ 6" Inductor Standalone and Installed in Application 
5.5.3 Ceiling Mounted Foam Generators 
The high expansion foam solution is distributed though ceiling mounted foam generators in accordance 
with the UFC 4-211-01 Design Criteria. The high expansion foam generators work by spraying the foam 
solution onto the foam screen while entraining air into the mixture via a blower fans, thereby creating a 
sudsy foam. As the foam flows through the generator it falls from the ceiling level and contacts the floor, 
where the foam spreads radially to provide complete coverage around the aircraft silhouette, and 
eventually the entire aircraft servicing area. 
Per ETL 02-15 and UFC 4-211-01, the foam generators are to be installed in close proximity, but not 
directly upon the aircraft. Additionally, the foam generator discharge pattern is not to be obstructed by 
structural member or where the floor is obstructed by service equipment (e.g. crane travel path). 
Generators are not to be located where the discharge patterns would block exits from the hangar bay 
within the first minute of discharge. Figure 5-13 includes a diagram of a high expansion foam riser. 
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Figure 5-13: Diagram of ANSUL JET-X-27 High Expansion Foam Generator 
 
Each hangar bay in the 3-bay maintenance hangar is provided with 8 high expansion foam generators. Six 
generators are located towards the front of the aircraft along the sides of the fuselage and 2 generators are 
located just behind the wings near the fuselage. The high expansion foam generators are required to be 
seismically mounted in accordance with ETL 02-15 regardless of the locations seismic design category. 
The foam distribution for this layout has been simulated mathematically and determined that the 
performance requirements should be met with enough of a safety factor upon system activation. Final 
acceptance of the system would occur during the final commissioning witnessed by the engineer of record 
and the Air Force Chief FPE. 
A risk of installing the generators in the incorrect location is that the performance criteria may not be 
achieved. If the generators are configured such that they discharge partly or fully onto the aircraft, the 
foam solution is not able to spread radially as designed. The manner in which the foam spreads across the 
hangar floor is essential for meeting the design criteria and ensuring proper blanketing of any liquid pools 
that may exist as the fire source.  
5.6 Fire Suppression Summary 
In summary, the fire suppression systems installed in this facility are in compliance with the ETL 2015 
and UFC 4-211-01. Related to the functionality of the sprinkler and foam suppression systems are the 
occupant notification and releasing logic of the systems. These components are addressed in the following 
Section.  
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6.0 FIRE DETECTION, ALARM, AND RELEASING SYSTEMS 
6.1 Fire Alarm and Mass Notification Systems 
The 3-bay maintenance hangar is provided with a fully addressable and electronically supervised fire 
alarm and mass notification system with battery backup in accordance with NFPA 72 as required by UFC 
3-600-01 section 5-3.1 and UFC 4-021-01. The design also meets the requirements of ETL 02-15. 
6.1.1 Fire Alarm and Mass Notification Panel 
The Fire Alarm and Mass Notification System (MNS) panel is located in Room 401. Per UFC 3-600-01 
section 5-4.2.7, the control panel is required to be located in a year-round environmentally conditioned 
area that complies with the environmental conditions included in the panels listing. Room 401 is normally 
conditioned and meets this criterion. 
The fire alarm/mass notification system used in this facility is an addressable Notifier system. The 
signaling line circuits (SLC), notification appliance circuits (NAC), and speaker circuits are fed off the 
fire alarm control panel (FACP) and 3 additional power supply units. Additionally, a total of 7 amplifiers 
are used for the speaker circuits throughout the facility.  
A total of 4 local operating consoles (LOC) are provided throughout the hangar bay. Two of the LOCs are 
located in hangar bays 1 and three while the other two LOCs are located in the corridors of each support 
space.  
Both Class A and Class B raceways are used in the SLC and NAC circuits.  
6.1.1.1 Fire Alarm Functional Matrix 
As required per NFPA 72, a functional programming matrix has been provided for the fire alarm and 
mass notification system in this facility. The matrix addresses the applicable alarm, trouble, and 
supervisory conditions, and the resulting actions taken by the control panel. The fire alarm functional 
matrix for this facility is shown in Figure 6-1.  
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Figure 6-1: FACP Functional Matrix 
6.1.2 Fire Alarm Initiating Devices 
The fire alarm system is initiated through a variety of both manual and automatic methods. The manual 
initiating method include manual fire alarm pull stations located within 5ft of each exit in the hangar bay 
and support areas in accordance with UFC 3-600-01 Section 5-3.2.1.    
The automatic alarm initiating methods include the smoke detector located over the fire alarm control 
panel in accordance with NFPA 72 and each water flow switch located on the wet-pipe sprinkler risers. 
Water flow switches are set to a 60 second retard delay in accordance with the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01. 
The fire alarm system will also initiate from the signal from the fire suppression control panel (FSCP) 
upon a foam release. For additional information on the foam releasing systems, refer to Section 6.2. 
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6.1.3 Fire Alarm Notification Appliances 
All areas of this facility are provided with audible and visual notification. A speaker or horn is not 
required in every room of the support areas, however, the speaker or horn performance is required to still 
meet the sound power and intelligibility requirements of NFPA 72 and UFC 4-021-01. The requirements 
of the UFC 3-600-01 require the installation of white strobes labeled ‘ALERT’ for the fire alarm and 
mass notification systems. Strobes are provided throughout the support areas in accordance with the 
strobe rating and spacing requirements of NFPA 72 section 18.5.5.4.   
Visual notification in the hangar bay is installed in accordance with the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 Section 3-
6.19.14.2. The requirements state that strobes shall be spaced in accordance with the room spacing 
requirements of NFPA 72 unless full coverage cannot be attained. In this case, visual notification is not 
required in the center of the hangar bay. Instead, strobes rated for a minimum 177 cd are to be placed 
around the perimeter of the hangar bay in center to center intervals not exceeding 68 ft and no greater 
than 34 ft from a perpendicular wall or hangar bay door opening. Due to the area of each hangar bay in 
this facility, the alternative method has been used.  
6.1.4 Mass Notification Design Criteria 
The DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 refers to UFC 4-021-01, Mass Notification Systems, for the design criteria 
for the mass notification system. UFC 4-021-01 Section 4-6.1.2 gives the requirements for intelligibility 
of the communicated messages. A common intelligibility score (CIS) of 0.8 is required to be achieved in 
the most remote area of each room of the support spaces. A visual metric displaying the CIS scale is 
shown in Figure 6-2. 
 
Figure 6-2: Speech Transmission Index versus Common Intelligibility Score Scale 
In areas of the building provided with hard wall and ceiling surfaces (such as metal or concrete) that are 
found to cause excessive sound reflections are permitted to have a CIS score of no less than 0.6 with a 0.8 
CIS score attainable within a 33ft walking distance in the same area. This criteria is helpful is designing a 
satisfactory voice messaging system in the hangar bays where the ceiling height is at least 75ft.  
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UFC 4-211-01 requires the tone used preceding a fire alarm message to be the three tone temporal pattern 
introduced in NFPA 72 Section 18.4.2.1. In general, this pattern serves as a distinctive evacuation signal 
to the building occupants. NFPA 72 Section 10.10 requires that alarm signals be distinctive in sounds and 
not used for any other purpose. For this reason, only the prerecorded fire message broadcast over the 
voice evacuation system uses this tone pattern. All other messages are preceded by a 5 second horn. A 
diagram of the three tone temporal pattern as shown in NFPA 72 is included in Figure 6-3. 
 
Figure 6-3: Three Tone Temporal Pattern Parameters 
6.1.4.1 Mass Notification Messages 
The following prerecorded messages have been provided. The mass notification messages in this facility 
are narrated by a female voice and state the following messages which are listed in order of priority. Once 
the message has finished playing, there is 2 second pause before the tone and message is repeated until 
the system is turned off at the panel or LOC.  
1. Three Pulse Temporal Pattern <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have 
your attention please. A fire emergency has been reported in the building. Please leave the 
building by the nearest exit.” 
2. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have 
your attention please. A bomb threat has been reported in the building. Please leave the building 
by the nearest exit.” 
3. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have 
your attention please. An intruder or hostile person has been reported in the building. Please take 
cover within the building.” 
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4. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have 
your attention please. Please take cover within the building until further notice.” 
5. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have 
your attention please. Evacuate the building by other than normal main exits.” 
6. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have 
your attention please. A weather emergency has been reported in this area. Please take cover 
within the building.” 
7. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have 
your attention please. All clear. The emergency has ended.” 
8. A horn is played for 5 Seconds <Three Rounds> “May I have your attention please. May I have 
your attention please. This is a test of the mass notification system” 
9. (Male voice) “May I have your attention please. May I have your attention please. A foam release 
has been reported in the building. Please walk to the nearest exit.” 
o (There would be a two second delay and then the alert tone and message would continue to 
cycle until the panel was reset by emergency responders) 
10. (Spare – No message) 
6.1.5 Voltage Drop and Battery Backup Calculations 
The requirements for voltage drop calculations are provided in NFPA 72 Section 7.2.1. For the system 
installed in this facility, a total of 12 circuits have been calculated. Each circuit is energized with a 
terminal voltage of 20.4 volts. Some of the calculations are conducted using the running total length 
method, while others are conducted using the lump sum calculation method. A summary of the voltage 
drop calculations for the fire alarm and mass notification systems are included in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1: Fire Alarm and Mass Notification System Voltage Drop Calculations Summary 
Circuit ID # Dev 
Total 
Length 
Total 
Current Gauge V Drop % 
V Drop 
(Volts) 
Max 
Length 
FACP-SIG1 12 518’-7 1690 mA   #12 9.91% 2.0208  - 
FACP-SIG2 9 746’-11 1113 mA #12 4.63% 0.9454 - 
PS/Amp1-SIG5 4 429’-1 1124 mA #12 7.87% 1.6053 - 
PS/Amp1-SIG6 4 947’-10 1124 mA #12 20.16% 4.113 470’-1 
PS/Amp1-SIG7 5 724’-2 1405 mA #12 19.25% 3.9265 376’-2 
PS/Amp1-SIG8 5 807’-7 1405 mA #12 21.48% 4.382 375’-11 
PS/Amp2-SIG9 11 445’-8 1265 mA #12 5.86% 1.1962 - 
PS/Amp2-SIG10 10 314’-0 1043 mA #12 6.20% 1.2642 506’-8 
PS/Amp2-SIG11 5 242’-7 1967 mA #12 6.40% 1.3048 375’-11 
PS/Amp2-SIG12 5 327’-7 1405 mA #12 7.82% 1.595 375’-11 
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Circuit ID # Dev 
Total 
Length 
Total 
Current Gauge V Drop % 
V Drop 
(Volts) 
Max 
Length 
PS/Amp2-SIG5 4 358’-8 1124 mA #12 7.64% 1.5576 469’-9 
PS/Amp2-SIG6 3 473’-7 843 mA #12 7.56% 1.5424 626’-4 
UFC 3-600-01 provides the applicable requirements for secondary power to the fire alarm system. In 
accordance with section 5-3.5, the requirements for secondary power for mass notification systems are 
determined per UFC 4-021-01.  
In accordance with UFC 4-021-01 section 4-4.5, power supply features are required to maintain battery 
backup power to supply power no less than that specified in NFPA 72. NFPA 72 Section 10.6.7.2.1.4 
requires 48 hours of standby power, followed by 15 minutes of full load operation. Additionally, the 
determined power requirements are required to include a minimum 20 percent safety factor. From these 
requirements, the system requires a total of 307.8 amp-hours (Ah). The calculations for the FACP and 
both power supply cabinets have been summarized in Table 6-2. 
Table 6-2: Fire Alarm and Mass Notification Backup Battery Calculation Summary 
Battery 
Calculation 
Total 
Standby 
(Amps) 
Total 
Alarm 
(Amps) 
Standby 
Requirement 
(48 Hrs)(Ah) 
Alarm 
Requirement 
(15 Min)(Ah) 
Battery 
Requirement 
(Ah) 
Battery 
Requirement 
+ 20% (Ah) 
FACP 2385.2 9375.5 114.5 2.3 116.8 140.2 
PS/Amp1 1800.0 17820.0 86.4 4.5 90.9 109.0 
PS/Amp2 901.0 22359.0 43.2 5.6 48.8 58.6 
6.2  Fire Suppression Releasing Systems 
The high expansion foam systems discussed in section 0 have been designed in accordance with the 
DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 and require specific releasing mechanisms and procedures. The systems provided 
for the foam water systems are to be provided independent of the buildings fire alarm and mass 
notification systems and shall not be used for any additional purposes.  
Both manual and automatic means of system activation have been provided per the UFC 4-211-01. A new 
requirement of the UFC 4-211-01 is the requirement of foam stop stations which can halt the flow of 
foam, even if it is already flowing from the generators, upon an inadvertent activation.  
Audible and visual notification of a foam system activation is provided in the hangar bay via voice 
messaging and blue rotating beacons. 
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6.2.1 Suppression Releasing Panel 
A dedicated releasing panel completely separate from all other systems is required per the DRAFT UFC 
4-211-01 section 3-16.19. The foam releasing panel shall be used only for the release of the foam systems 
and no other purpose. This procedure is to reduce the occurrence of inadvertent system activations, which 
has historically been an issue with these systems for the Air Force.  
The releasing panel is required to be located in a normally environmentally conditioned space. This panel 
is located adjacent the fire alarm control panel in Room 401. 
For this facility, a Det-Tronics Eagle Quantum Premier releasing panel has been provided in accordance 
with Section 5-6.3. The purpose for the selection of this panel by the Air Force is due to its programmable 
logic controls and voting capabilities. Voting differs from the traditional mechanism of cross-zoning by 
observing only the simultaneous signals from any of the detection devices monitored by the panel. 
Additional information on the voting system is included in Section 6.2.1.1. 
6.2.1.1 Releasing Systems Functional Matrix 
The DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 provides the minimum programming requirements for releasing panels in Air 
Force hangars. The foam releasing mechanisms are for this system include both automatic and manual 
means of activation.  
The foam system is released by manual releasing stations located in internals along the normal path of 
egress travel. Upon activation of a releasing station, the flow control valve solenoid is energized, opening 
the valve. Manual foam stop stations utilizing a “dead-man” switch are also provided in the hangar to halt 
the release of foam. When held down continuously, the flow control valve will close within 15 seconds. 
For additional information on the manual foam releasing and stop stations, refer to section 6.2.2. 
The foam systems are released automatically when the releasing panel receives two simultaneous votes 
from optical flame detection in the hangar bay. When a signal is received by the panel, it registers as an 
instantaneous “vote”. When the programmed voting criteria is met, the system is released. For this 
facility, the releasing panel monitors the signals from the optical flame detectors in each hangar bay and 
releases the foam system upon receiving two simultaneous votes. The provided manual stop stations are 
capable of halting the release of foam initialized by the optical flame detection.  
The functional matrix provided in UFC 4-211-01 is shown in Figure 6-4. This releasing matrix closely 
resembles that of the system installed in this facility, with the exception of the heat-detectors associated 
pre-action system. A pre-action system is not provided in this facility.  
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Figure 6-4: Releasing System Functional Matrix for the Air Force 
6.2.2 Manual Foam Start/Stop Devices 
The high expansion foam systems in this facility are required to be provided with a manual means of 
activation in accordance with DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 section 3-6.19.8. Per this requirement, 
“distinctively different” manual foam releasing stations from the manual fire alarm pull stations are 
required. Manual releasing stations are required to be NEMA 4 rated, yellow in color, and include the 
lettering “FOAM” on the front of the station. Additionally, clear plastic tamper covers capable of 
producing an audible alarm are required over the device. Conventional pull station devices are required to 
be used instead of addressable components. Lastly, foam releasing stations are required to be of the 
locking type that when activated require a key to be reset. Clear and distinct signage is also required for 
the manual foam releasing stations. A diagram of the manual foam start station installation requirements 
are shown below in Figure 6-5. 
Culminating Experience In Fire Protection Final 3-Bay Aircraft General Maintenance Hangar 
 
FPE-596 6-46 Z. Ataiyan 
 
 
Figure 6-5: Manual Foam Releasing Station Diagram 
The manual foam releasing station assembly shown in the figure above is required to be located within 
the hangar bay so they are unobstructed, readily accessible, and located in the natural egress path to each 
required exit or exit access. Additionally, a maximum linear spacing of 200 ft between manual foam 
releasing stations around the perimeter of the hangar bay, not including the hangar bay door, is not to be 
exceeded. Manual foam releasing stations are required to maintain a minimum separation distance of 5 ft 
from general fire alarm pull stations to avoid unintentional system activations.  
A new requirement of the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 are manual foam stop stations that are able to halt the 
release of foam even after the deluge valve on the foam riser has been released. Section 3-6.19.9 requires 
the installation of NEMA 4 rated manual foam stop stations of the “dead-man” type within 12 inches 
from each manual foam releasing station. In addition to the manual stop stations, distinct signage is to be 
provided at each device. A detailed view of the device and accompanying signage is shown below in 
Figure 6-6. 
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Figure 6-6: Manual Foam Stop Station 
The manual foam stop station operates as long as the push button is depressed and held down. The system 
is to be designed such that the stop station prevents/stops discharge of the foam/water system regardless 
of whether or not the system was activated automatically or manually, and whether or not the activation 
occurs prior to or after the stop station is pressed and held. The system is also to be design such that the 
time to fully close the flow control valve on the foam/water riser does not exceed 15 seconds under full 
flow. Where the foam/water system is still in alarm, the system is to be designed such that time to fully 
open the flow control valve does not exceed 5 seconds upon release. 
6.2.3 Automatic Foam Initiation Devices 
In addition to manual releasing stations, automatic means of foam activation is required per the DRAFT 
UFC 4-211-01. Section 3-6.19.11 requires the installation of optical flame detection and provides 
installation requirements.  
Section 5-6.3 provides Air Force specific criteria for optical flame detection. Per this section, Det-Tronics 
X3301 Multispectrum IR Flame Detectors are to be used in conjunction with the Det-Tronics Eagle 
Quantum Premier Releasing Panel discussed in Section 6.2.1. Det-Tronics has manufactured a model of 
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the X3301 flame detector that includes a software feature marketed as “Hangar Mode”. According to the 
manufacturer, Hangar Mode detectors provide relay outputs for fires after an increased verification time 
to a sustained fire. The detector has been optimized to provide a longer processing time to fires while still 
maintaining the extended detection range. The purpose of this additional validation is to reduce nuisance 
alarms and inadvertent foam system activations due to false fire detection.  
The optical flame detection is provided in the hangar bay such that all areas of each hangar bay are within 
the cone-of-vision of at least three detectors. Because of the single aircraft wing area of exceeds 1000 SF, 
a minimum of two OFDs covering the aircraft silhouette on each side of the fuselage have been provided. 
A sample schematic of a proposed OFD layout that includes six (6) OFDs is included in Figure 6-7. 
 
Figure 6-7: Optical Flame Detector Layout in Hangar Bay 3 
The detectors are angled and provided with field of view inhibitors (blinders) such that the cone of vision 
is contained within the hangar bay such that it does not extend more than 5 ft outside the hangar bay. 
Detectors are mounted per Det-Tronics specifications at approximately 8 ft above the finished floor. 
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Additionally, 5 ft of flexible conduit is provided at each detector to allow or minor adjustments during 
testing or changes in the mission of the hangar. 
6.2.4 Foam System Notification Appliances 
In accordance with the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01, dedicated visual notification of a foam release in the 
hangar bays are to be provided. Per section 5-6.4 blue rotating beacons that are rated no less than 400 cd 
powered from a dedicated emergency power panel. The initiation of the beacons is to be exclusively 
controlled though the releasing panel.  
Per the Draft UFC 4-211-01, beacons shall be mounted 20-30 ft above the floor of the hangar bay. For 
single door hangars, like each of the hangar bays in this facility, a beacon shall be centered on each wall 
and accompanied by signs located next to each beacon that reads “FOAM RELESASE WHEN 
ILLUMINATED” in red lettering not less than 3 inches high. The accompanying signage requirement 
seeks to ensure that building occupants can clearly identify the purpose of this type of notification.  
In previous design standards, blue strobes were used in the hangar bay to notify occupants of a foam 
release. This often lead to trouble, however, because the drastic derating of the strobe by the blue lens was 
often not accounted for during design and resulted in a nearly undeterminable visual signal. 
During the event of a foam system release in any of the three hangars, a message will play throughout 
each hangar bay and both support areas over the emergency voice communication system notifying 
occupants of a foam discharge in the hangar bay.  
6.2.5 Foam System Voltage Drop and Backup Battery Calculations 
The requirements of the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01 state that only devices required for the release of the 
foam system are permitted to be connected to the releasing panel. For this facility, only the optical flame 
detectors and the flow control valve solenoids are connected to the panel. The releasing panel receives 
22.0 volts from the power supply and, after conductor losses, supplies 21.2 volts to each connected 
device. Each device is connected to directly to the panel without the use of junction boxes in accordance 
with the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01. The releasing panel voltage drop calculations are included in Table 6-3. 
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Table 6-3: Releasing Panel Voltage Drop Calculations 
  Device 
Distance 
(ft) 
Current 
Draw 
(Amps) AWG 
Voltage 
Drop 
Voltage at 
device end 
Primary Power supply to Panel 20 6.4 #14 0.8 V 21.2 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 101_1 405 0.16 #14 0.4 V 20.8 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 101_2 625 0.16 #14 0.6 V 20.6 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 101_3 420 0.16 #14 0.4 V 20.8 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 101_4 220 0.16 #14 0.2 V 21.0 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 101_5 400 0.16 #14 0.4 V 20.8 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 101_6 400 0.16 #14 0.4 V 20.8 V 
Secondary Panel to Riser Solenoid 1 200 0.5 #14 0.6 V 20.6 V 
Secondary Panel to Riser Solenoid 2 50 0.5 #14 0.2 V 21.0 V 
Secondary Panel to Riser Solenoid 3 110 0.5 #14 0.3 V 20.9 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 201_1 220 0.16 #14 0.2 V 21.0 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 201_2 240 0.16 #14 0.2 V 21.0 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 201_3 345 0.16 #14 0.3 V 20.9 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 201_4 110 0.16 #14 0.1 V 21.1 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 201_5 400 0.16 #14 0.4 V 20.8 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 201_6 400 0.16 #14 0.4 V 20.8 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 301_1 110 0.16 #14 0.1 V 21.1 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 301_2 325 0.16 #14 0.3 V 20.9 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 301_3 540 0.16 #14 0.5 V 20.7 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 301_4 320 0.16 #14 0.3 V 20.9 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 301_5 400 0.16 #14 0.4 V 20.8 V 
Secondary Panel to Flame Det 301_6 400 0.16 #14 0.4 V 20.8 V 
Observing the results of the calculations, minor voltage drops occur at each device the fed from the panel. 
This confirms that the minimum operating voltages of the connected devices will be provided.  
Additionally, backup battery requirements were determined in accordance with NFPA 72 section 
10.6.7.2.1.4, which requires 48 hours of standby power followed by 15 minutes of full load operation. For 
this releasing panel, the total battery amp hours required, including the 20% safety factor, is 229 amp 
hours. The backup battery calculation is summarized in Table 6-4. 
Table 6-4: Releasing Panel Backup Battery Calculation Summary 
Battery 
Calculation 
Total 
Standby 
(Amps) 
Total 
Alarm 
(Amps) 
Standby 
Requirement 
(48 Hrs)(Ah) 
Alarm 
Requirement 
(15 Min)(Ah) 
Battery 
Requirement 
(Ah) 
Battery 
Requirement 
+ 20% (Ah) 
FSCP 3.95 6.40 189.6 1.59 191.19 229.43 
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6.3 Fire Detection, Alarm, and Releasing Summary 
Overall, the provided detection, alarm, and releasing systems meet the intent and are in compliance with 
the UFC 3-600-01, UFC 4-211-01, and UFC 4-021-01.  
At this point in the prescriptive analysis, all major systems have been addressed. The following section 
evaluates a performance based validation of the provided systems.   
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7.0 PERFORMANCE BASED DESIGN ANALYSIS 
7.1 Performance Based Design Overview 
To determine the effectiveness of the prescriptive codes and standards, a performance based fire 
protection and life safety analysis has been conducted. The analysis follows the methods presented in 
NFPA 101, Life Safety Code - Chapter 5 and the SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance-Based Fire 
Protection: Analysis and Design of Buildings. The following chapter contains a detailed analysis of the 
effects of a jet fuel pool fire located underneath a wing of a KC-46 parked in Hangar Bay 3. 
7.1.1 Project Scope 
The following analysis will evaluate a fire in Hangar Bay 3. The hangar bays in this analysis will include 
the fire protection systems discussed in Sections 1.0 through 6.0 of this report including; 
 A low-level high expansion foam/water system designed to meet the requirements of ETL 02-15, 
and UFC 4-211-01, 
 and voting multispectrum IR optical flame detection used to initiate the foam system 
The overall outcome of the analysis and evaluation shall be to the approval of the USAF Fire Protection 
Engineer, Base Commander, design team, and any other unnamed stakeholders.  
7.1.2 Identifying Goals 
Success of this evaluation will depend on the defined goals of the USAF for the protection of this facility. 
The goals that will be used for this analysis include the following: 
 Providing life safety for the building occupants and emergency responders. 
 Protection of the three KC-46 aircraft and the 3-Bay Maintenance Hangar. 
 Maintaining continuity of aircraft maintenance operations. 
Life safety goals will be achieved though reducing the required safe egress time through effective 
occupant notification, via mass notification systems, upon the earliest fire detection possible initiated by 
optical flame detection.  
The protection of the aircraft and hangar facility will be accomplished through appropriate fire 
suppression systems that will be initiated while the fire is still in its incipient stage. 
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7.1.3 Stakeholder and Design Objectives 
Historically, the USAF has placed a greater emphasis on the protection of the hangar from a fire incident 
than the protection of the aircraft during a fire incident. Evolutions of design standards have worked to 
change the priorities from an infrastructure protection consideration to an aircraft protection 
consideration. 
There have been numerous studies conducted on the effects of radiant heat exposure to aircraft composite 
materials. Results from these studies conclude that the time of exposure to various heat fluxes dictate the 
time of exterior coating delamination. As delamination occurs, the residual mechanical strength in flexure 
is diminished and the tensile strength of the materials are greatly reduced [1].  
Limiting the exposure time of critical radiant heat flux to the aircraft in accordance with Error! 
Reference source not found. by the application of high expansion foam has been established as a design 
objective by the stakeholders.  
7.1.4 Performance Criteria 
Defining any and all performance criteria is dependent on the criteria defined by the building codes and 
project stakeholders. As explained in Section 7.1.2, overall objectives of the USAF are to preserve life 
and preserve the integrity of the aircraft.  The performance criteria for this analysis has been divided into 
two categories;  
 Life Safety Criteria 
 Aircraft Protection Criteria 
The life safety criteria specified will serve to regulate the thresholds of fire effects which the building 
occupants would be exposed. Aircraft Protection Criteria will examine the physical limits of the aircraft 
when exposed to fires of various sizes.  
7.1.4.1 Life Safety Performance Criteria 
The primary life safety performance criteria has been established in accordance with NFPA 101 Section 
5.2.2. This section requires that any occupant who is not intimate with ignition shall not be exposed to 
instantaneous or cumulative untenable conditions. Due to the nature of the fire scenario evaluated in this 
analysis, it is hypothesized that occupants in Hangar Bay 3 will have ample time to egress out of the 
building before the smoke or toxic gas layer descents to a height of 6 ft above the highest walking surface 
in the hangar bay. The timing of this evacuation means that no occupant is exposed to instantaneous or 
cumulative untenable conditions.  
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This performance criteria was chosen because it addresses the occupant’s ability to egress in a scenario 
where the smoke is not extracted from the space or area. Because the hangar bay does not include heat or 
smoke vents, ensuring adequate occupant egress is of key importance. For this reason, Method 2 as 
defined in Section A.5.2.2 of the Life Safety Code has been chosen as the primary life safety performance 
criteria for this analysis.  
7.1.4.2 Aircraft Protection Criteria 
At the time of this analysis, the USAF has not publically released documentation concerning acceptable 
thresholds for aircraft damage in the event of a fire. Therefore, engineering judgement has been applied to 
establish unique criteria for this facility and the aircraft therein. The following bulleted list includes stated 
assumptions for this analysis 
 The aircraft is constructed on aluminum alloys and stainless steel 
 10 seconds for full fire development based on a flame spread rate of 1.35 m/s. 
 Stainless steel and aluminum fuselages will reach yield strength in 15 to 35 seconds when 
exposed to a radiant heat flux of 90 kW/m2 per the study – Prediction of Aircraft Damage Time in 
Post-Crash Fires 
Depending on the conditions, hangar fires can cause significant damage to the aircraft such that it would 
be considered as irreparable. Inoperable/irreparable aircraft threaten the continuity of operations for the 
USAF, which can lead to further logistical issues and excessive financial burden.  
Further, the potential fuel loading contained in the wing fuel tanks of the aircraft possess the greatest fire 
hazard to the aircraft and building structure. For this reason, the metric that will be used in this analysis 
will be the time that the aircraft is exposed to radiant heat fluxes that have been determined to cause the 
aluminum alloys to yield.  
Finally, the effect of early suppression via the high expansion foam system will be incorporated into the 
analysis to determine if the aircraft will reach yield strength.  
7.2 Design Fire Scenarios 
In accordance with NFPA 101 section 5.5.3, the guidelines for Design Fire Scenario 1 have been adopted 
for this analysis.  
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Regarding Design Fire Scenario 1, Section 5.5.3.1 states that the fire scenario shall be described as an 
occupancy-specific fire representative of a typical fire for the occupancy. It is required that the scenario 
account for the following items: 
 Occupant Activities 
 Number and Location of Occupants 
 Room Size 
 Contents and Furnishings 
 Fuel Properties and Ignition Sources 
 Ventilation Conditions 
 Identification of the first item ignited and its location 
In this aircraft hangar, a typical fire for the occupancy would be a JP-8 pool fire located underneath one of 
the wings of the aircraft.  
The design fire scenario for this analysis assumes an occupied hangar during routine on aircraft 
maintenance operations. The left aircraft wing experiences failure in a drain valve causing JP-8 fuel to 
begin spilling onto the hangar floor. Upon maintenance personnel successfully halting the flow of fuel 
from the wing, approximately 3-5 minutes, 60 gallons of JP-8 has spilled onto the floor and has spread 
radially outwards. Additional information on the size of the fuel spill is given in Section 0. 
The fuel is unintentionally ignited by a maintenance technician that is arc welding near the hangar door. 
The torch is dropped while operating and makes contact with the edge of the spill, igniting the fuel. The 
flame spreads along the surface of the spill until the entire surface area is involved. There are no 
additional combustible materials within proximity to the fire and the fire does not spread.  
During the fire, the hangar door is closed and oxygen available to the hangar bay is limited to the air 
present in the room at the time of ignition. 
7.2.1 Assumptions 
As part of this performance based analysis, the following assumptions have been made about the 
conditions at the hangar.  
 Hangar is occupied by personnel performing routine maintenance operations at the time of the 
spill 
 Fire protection systems are installed in accordance with ETL 02-15 and UFC 4-211-01 
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 Upon ignition, the fire detection systems work as intended and the performance criteria of the 
foam/water system is effectively met.  
7.2.2 Building Characteristics 
Due to the geometry of the fuel spill and the distance from all walls and doors, it has been assumed that 
the fire will be controlled by the fire suppression systems prior to spreading to the rest of the building.  
7.2.3 Occupant Characteristics. 
The occupant characteristics for this facility have been defined in accordance with NFPA 101 section 
5.4.5.  In general, this facility will be occupied by enlisted personnel, officers, and civilians contracted by 
the USAF.  
7.2.3.1 Response Characteristics 
Due to the nature of this facility, it has been assumed that all normal building occupants will be active 
USAF personnel and will thereby differ from a general population in terms of sensibility, reactivity, 
mobility, and susceptibility. 
Sensibility – Because this facility is located on an active duty Air Force installation and is populated with 
military personnel, it is assumed that all building occupants possess the ability to sense the sounding of an 
alarm and discern unusual visual cues. 
Reactivity – It is assumed that occupants are capable of interpreting cues correctly and responding 
appropriately. Mandated emergency response training and regular fire drills performed by building 
occupants reinforce this assumption. For this analysis, it has been assumed that hangar occupants will not 
act to manually initiate foam suppression systems, although this is likely in reality.  
Mobility – Building occupants are assumed to possess the appropriate mobility for working on, near, or 
around large aircraft. Published USAF physical fitness requirements for both enlisted personnel and 
officers reinforce this assumption.  
Susceptibility – It is assumed that building occupants are in generally good health and do not possesses 
physical ailments that would prohibit them from self-preservation during the early stages of a fire event.  
7.2.3.2 Location 
It is assumed at the time of the fire that each normally occupied space in the hangar bay and support areas 
will contain at least one building occupant located at the most remote point from the nearest available 
exit.  
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7.2.3.3 Number of Occupants 
Per NFPA 101 Section 5.4.5.4, this analysis shall be based on the maximum number of people that every 
occupied room or area is expected to contain. For this scenario, the occupant load calculated in Section 
3.1 will be used to represent the number of occupants in the hangar bay and rest of the building.  
7.2.3.4 Staff Assistance 
It is assumed that building occupants who regularly perform maintenance operations in this facility are 
familiar with the procedures in manually initializing the foam fire suppression systems. However, for the 
purpose of this analysis observing the effects of the automatic systems, it is assumed that the manual 
foam releasing stations discussed in Section 6.2.2 are not used.  
7.3 ASET versus RSET Analysis 
To determine if the life safety performance criteria specified in Section 7.1.4.1 is met, a comparative 
analysis of the available safe egress time (ASET) and the required safe egress time (RSET) has been 
conducted. The concept of an ASET versus RSET analysis is introduced in the SFPE Handbook of Fire 
Protection Engineers in Chapter 3-12, Evacuation Time by Proulx ET. AL. A diagram from chapter 3-12 
is included in Figure 7-1. 
 
Figure 7-1: Available Safe Egress Time Milestones 
Because the fire in this scenario occurs in the hangar bay, the time for the smoke layer to descent to a 
height of 6ft above the hangar floor was expected to be greater than the required egress time from the 
hangar. 
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7.3.1 Available Safe Egress Time Determination 
The ASET for this scenario was determined by evaluating at what time the tenability limit specified in 
Section 7.1.4.1 occurs. The methods used for this analysis were selected from Chapter 3-9 of the SFPE 
HB. Using the geometrical properties of the hangar bay, the design fire parameters, and the tenability 
limits, the time for the smoke layer to descend to a height of 6ft above the floor was determined using the 
equation below: 
𝑡 =  {
(𝑛 + 3)
2
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𝐴𝑠
𝐻2
) 𝐻4/3
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The time for the smoke layer to descend to a height of 6ft above the floor was determined to be 224 
seconds (3.7 Minutes). For a complete analytical solution and determination of the available safe egress 
time, refer to Appendix F. 
It should be noted that applying this method of smoke decent to a fire of this magnitude provides a 
conservative time for ASET. In reality, as the smoke layer descends to the top of the flame, the rate at 
which the smoke layer descends will significantly decrease. This phenomenon is caused when the oxygen 
being entrained into the plume is displaces by the descending smoke layer. In essence, the fire is 
smothered by its own entrained combustion products. Therefore, a decent time of 224 seconds in the 
hangar bay is a conservative figure for this analysis.  
7.3.2 Required Safe Egress Time Determination 
The RSET for this facility has been determined in accordance with the methods presented in SFPE HB 
Chapter 3-13. From this chapter, the following equation for determining RSET is provided: 
𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑇 =  𝑡𝑑 + 𝑡𝑛 + 𝑡𝑝−𝑒 + 𝑡𝑒 
Where:  
 td = Time from fire ignition to detection; that is, the detection phase 
tn = Time from detection to notification of occupants of a fire emergency; that is the notification 
phase 
tp-e = Time from notification (or cue reception) until evacuation commences; that is, the pre-
evacuation phase 
te = Time from the start of purposive evacuation movement until safety is reached; that is, the 
evacuation phase 
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7.3.2.1 Detection and Notification Phases 
The detection phase has been assumed based on two factors. The first factor accounts for the event that 
the hangar occupants would detect the fire upon ignition prior to the optical flame detectors located in the 
hangar bay. The second factor accounts for the fire detection via optical flame detection. Of these cases, 
the detection by OFD provides a greater time to activation and, therefore, has been used for this analysis. 
Whether the fire is detected manually or automatically, the detection phase will be relatively short. For 
the purposes of this analysis, the detection and notification phases have combined into one time. From the 
initiation of the fire, it is assumed there will be 10 seconds before the fire is observed by the optical flame 
detectors. This figure has been derived from Det-Tronics published data on X3301 Optical Flame 
Detectors installed with “Hangar Mode”. From the published data, the detectors are capable of detecting a 
2x2 ft JP-5 pool fire on medium sensitivity in 9 seconds on average. Using this figure for the detection 
time, and assuming a notification time of 1 second yields a combined time of 10 seconds has been used.  
7.3.2.2 Pre-evacuation Phase 
The pre-evacuation time for this facility has been determined in accordance with SFPE HB Chapter 3-12. 
Several assumptions have been established to support the selected pre-evacuation time. 
 Upon ignition, the hangar occupants are able to sense the fire cues, causing occupants to have 
much shorter recognition and response times. 
 An emergency voice communication system is installed in this facility that can clearly define the 
nature of the reported incident and provide instruction to building occupants who are not intimate 
with the fire source.  
Given the assumptions listed above, a pre-evacuation time of 10 seconds has been adopted. This pre-
movement durations are based on SFPE HB Chapter 12-3 for buildings with occupants trained in fire 
evacuation.  
7.3.2.3 Evacuation Phase 
From the initiation of the fire, a 10 second detection time before the fire is observed by the optical flame 
detectors and 10 seconds of pre-movement upon alarm before occupant evacuation.  Therefore from the 
initiation of the fire, it is assumed 20 seconds will pass before occupant movement begins.  
Additionally, it has been assumed that only the occupants in Hangar Bay 3 will be egressing through the 
hangar bay’s exits. Occupants in the other hangar bays and support spaces will utilize their nearest exit.  
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7.3.2.3.1 Hydraulic Movement Model   
The evacuation time has been calculated with the methods introduced in SFPE HB Chapter 3-13. In this 
model, all occupants will use all 12 exits equally, begin egress at the same time, and travel the maximum 
allowable travel distance.     
Results from this model indicate that the movement time for 96 occupants from Hangar Bay 3 is 71 
seconds. For a complete analytical solution and determination of the movement time, refer to Appendix F. 
7.3.2.3.2 Pathfinder Model 
The evacuation phase was also determined using a human movement and evacuation modeling software. 
Pathfinder software by Thunderhead Engineering was used to determine the movement time for 96 
occupants located randomly throughout Hangar Bay 3. In this model, all 12 exits from the hangar bay 
were utilized. The obstruction caused by the presence of the aircraft was included in the navigable travel 
path. An image of the pathfinder model prior to movement initialization is shown in Figure 7-2.  
 
Figure 7-2: Image of Hangar Bay 3 Pathfinder Evacuation Model 
The results of the simulation show that the hangar bay is completely evacuated 35 seconds after 
movement begins. This calculation serves as a useful validation when compared to the hydraulic 
movement model time of 71 seconds. To determine the worst case RSET, the more restrictive value for 
evacuation time has been used.  
Culminating Experience In Fire Protection Final 3-Bay Aircraft General Maintenance Hangar 
 
FPE-596 7-61 Z. Ataiyan 
 
7.3.2.4 RSET Conclusions 
The various phases of the required safe egress time have been determined to accurately depict the 
conditions associated with the design fire scenario. From this analysis, RSET was determined to be 91 
seconds from fire ignition to the last occupant egressed from the hangar. A summary of the RSET is 
included in Table 7-1. For a complete analytical solution and determination of the RSET, refer to 
Appendix F. 
Table 7-1: Required Safe Egress Time Phase Duration Summary 
Phase in Evacuation Time 
Time from fire ignition to detection; that is, the detection phase, td 9 Seconds 
Time from detection to notification of occupants of a fire emergency; that is the 
notification phase, tn 
1 Seconds 
Time from notification (or cue reception) until evacuation commences; that is, the 
pre-evacuation phase, tp-e 
10 Seconds 
Time from the start of purposive evacuation movement until safety is reached; that 
is, the evacuation phase, te 
71 Seconds 
Required Safe Egress Time 91 Seconds 
 
7.3.3 ASET versus RSET Conclusions 
A review and comparison of the results of the individual ASET and RSET analysis indicate that the 
required safe egress time is less than the available safe egress time by a factor of 2.46. Where the time for 
the smoke layer in hangar 3 to descend to a height of 6 ft above the finished floor is 224 seconds, the time 
for complete evacuation of the hangar is 91 seconds. A summary of the results of this analysis are 
included in Table 7-2. 
Table 7-2: ASET versus RSET Results Summary 
Required Safe Egress Time Available Safe Egress Time % Difference 
91 Seconds 224 Seconds 84.4% 
Other findings from the RSET analysis indicate that at 91 seconds after fire ignition, the smoke layer had 
only descended to a height of 27.1 ft. From these results, it has been concluded that the RSET includes an 
appropriate margin of safety from the ASET and therefore, the life safety criteria defined in Section 
7.1.4.1 has been successfully met.   
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7.4 Aircraft Protection Fire Simulation Model 
The Design Fire Scenario defined in Section 7.2 will also be evaluated to determine the incidental fire 
effects on the aircraft.  
7.4.1 Background 
To model the fire scenario, Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS) was utilized. FDS is an open-source software 
produced by the National Institute for Standards and Testing (NIST). FDS is widely used among the fire 
engineering community and boasts many strengths over other Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) 
software, including its focus on key physical mechanisms and solvers important for fire modeling. FDS 
also boasts advantages as a powerful visualization tool. 
FDS is designed to predict fire-driven fluid flow including, but not limited to, smoke and airflow 
movement caused by fire, wind, and ventilation systems. FDS has been widely used and verified to 
produce accurate results that greatly correlates to real life scenarios. The software functions by 
numerically solving forms of the Navier-Stokes equations appropriate for low-speed, thermally-driven 
flow, with emphasis on smoke and heat transport from fires. It also has integrated sub models that 
calculate many fire-related phenomena such as radiative and convective heat transfer, sprinkler activation 
and sprinkler sprays, and mixture-fraction combustion model. 
7.4.2 Hangar Geometry 
The hangar geometry modeled for this analysis reflects the layout of Hangar Bay 3. The dimensions of the 
model are true to the actual hangar design with the exception of minor adjustments made to increase FDS 
efficiency. The hangar bay has been modeled independently without the support area or additional hangar 
bays attached.  
The sloped roof was modeled as shown in white in Figure 7-3 using a “&MULT” command to replicate 
the actual design. The draft curtains at the ceiling were also modeled as shown in purple and will serve to 
contain the hot gas layer as required per the prescriptive codes.  
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Figure 7-3: Preliminary Hangar Bay and Aircraft Geometry 
 
7.4.3 Fuel Spill Analysis 
During the 2014 fiscal year, [SOURCE REDACTED] indicates at least [QUANTITY REDACTED] 
separate incidents in which an aircraft fuel tank was discovered to have leaked fuel. The jet fuel expelled 
during these incidents totals roughly 2,110 gallons with the smallest spill being 7 gallons and the largest 
being 1,000 gallons. This data will serve as the foundation for modeling probable fire scenarios.  
This fuel spill data was further analyzed to determine a pattern. The spills ranged between 0 and 120 
gallons with the exception of one very large fuel spill. This large spill, measured at 1000 gallons, was not 
consistent with the rest of the fuel spill data. For the purposes of determining the design fire this large 
spill was considered an anomaly and discarded. This left a range of spills which fit a consistent pattern 
that could be used to generate a design fire.  
To develop a fire scenario, the remaining fuel spill data was evaluated. The fuel size selected needed to 
portray an accurate representation of all potential fires that may develop. Selecting a quantity at the top of 
the range may exclude any differentiations created by smaller spills. Conversely, selecting a spill size that 
is too small would not accurately portray a fire generated by a larger spill. The median of the fuel range 
was taken to determine the most adequate representation of the data. After analyzing the data, a 60 gallon 
fuel spill was determined to be the quantity to best represent the respective fuel range.  
Because detailed information about the KC-46 fuel systems are unavailable, this 60 gallon quantity of fuel 
has been used to develop the design fire. 
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7.4.4 Fuel Characteristics 
JP-8 has been identified as the aviation fuel used by the USAF and will be used as the fuel source for the 
fire modeled in this analysis. In order for FDS to accurately predict the reactions within the model, 
several properties of the fuel must be specified. 
In Table 7-3, the primary properties of JP-8 used for this analysis are identified. Research showed that for 
some properties of JP-8, a range of possibilities existed. For example, the density of JP-8 can often range 
from 775 to 840 kg/m3 [1].  
In order to maintain consistency throughout the analysis, a single value for each property was selected 
and maintained throughout the scenario. This point was identified based on the conditions in which the 
fuel would likely be found at the initiation of the model. 
Table 7-3: Summary of JP-8 Fuel Characteristics [1] 
Flash Point 38° C 
Boiling Point 300° C 
Density 805 kg/m3 
Viscosity 1.60 mm2/sec 
Specific Heat 1.97 kJ/kg∙K 
Thermal Conductivity 0.12 W/m∙K 
Heat of Vaporization 360 kJ/kg 
Heat of Combustion 43,240 kJ/kg 
Auto Ignition Temperature 238° C 
Mass Loss Rate 0.051 kg/m2∙s 
Extinction-absorption Coefficient 3.6 1/m 
7.4.4.1 Fuel Spill Geometry 
The fuel spill flows out of the left wing tank drain valve and on to the hangar floor. The geometry of the 
fuel spill is largely dependent on the volume of fuel spilled and the physical properties of the fuel.  
Utilizing data from a published Pacific Northwest National Laboratories report on spill geometries on flat 
inclined surfaces [3], the depth of a liquid spill on a flat surface was determined. The depth was then used 
to generate a surface area based on the overall volume of fuel spilled. Based the information provided in 
the PNNL document, it was assumed that the fuel spill will spread out radially upon hitting the ground, 
and therefore, a square fuel spill has been defined in the FDS model. The pool spill characteristics are 
listed in the table below: 
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Table 7-4: Fuel Spill Geometry Summary 
Volume of Fuel Spilled (ft3) Fuel Depth (ft) Surface Area (ft2) 
8.0 0.011155 [3] 719 
The location and size of the fuel spill relative to the aircraft is shown in Figure 7-4.  
 
Figure 7-4: Defined Location and Size of Fuel Spill 
7.4.5 Aircraft Characteristics 
The hangar is occupied by a KC-46 aircraft during the fire scenario. To evaluate the effects of the fire on 
the aircraft, the KC-46 has been programmed into FDS. 
For FDS to correctly calculate the effect of the fire on an aircraft, the emissivity, conductivity, density, 
and specific heat of the aircraft has been specified on the “&MATL” line.  
&MATL ID = 'ALUM' 
 EMISSIVITY = 0.9 
 CONDUCTIVITY = 167 
 DENSITY = 2700 
 SPECIFIC_HEAT = .900/ 
It is important to note that the properties above, with the exception of the emissivity, are for generic 
aluminum and do not reflect any changes that may occur do to the addition of filler metals, advanced 
coatings, or paints applied to the surface. The emissivity is based on the average emissivity found among 
a sample of aircraft grade paints. 
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7.4.6 Validation 
In order to ensure the model is accurately reflecting a real world scenario, several validation checks were 
made. These checks ensure that the simulation is operating as expected and accurately portraying the fire 
scenario.  
Due to limitations of FDS, some important components of the simulation cannot be validated. In 
response, these parameters were programmed into FDS to ensure an accurate representation of the fire 
scenario. 
7.4.6.1 Heat Release Rate 
FDS possesses several means and methods available to calculate the Heat Release Rate (HRR) of a fire. A 
large amount of research has been conducted to validate its accuracy. However, these relationships begin 
to break down when used to model large scale pool fires. Because of this, the HRR of each fire scenario is 
calculated based on known equations and specified in FDS to ensure accuracy.  
To determine the HRR of the pool fire several parameters are needed. These include the asymptotical 
mass loss rate, heat of combustion, extinction-absorption coefficient, estimated diameter, and the surface 
area of the fuel.  
First the effective diameter must be determined based on the fuel spill surface area. Because the  
𝐷 =  √
4𝐴
𝜋
 
Second, the HRR for liquid pools can be determined using the following relation given in SFPE HB 
Chapter 3-1. 
?̇? =  ∆ℎ𝑐?̇?∞
" (1 − 𝑒−𝑘𝛽𝐷)𝐴 
A summary of the heat release rate calculation results are shown in Table 7-5 below. 
Table 7-5: Calculated Heat Release Rate 
Volume of Fuel Spilled (ft3) Surface Area (ft2) Estimated Diameter (ft) Peak HRR (MW) 
8.0 719.0 30.3 147.3 
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7.4.6.2 Burning Duration 
Just as the HRR was programmed into FDS, the burning duration has also been predefined. This is not 
due to FDS’ inabilities to calculate the burning duration, but rather due to the specification of the peak 
HRR. Because the HRR is specified within the model, the duration at which the fire lasts must be 
identified as well. 
The duration of the fire has been calculated using well proven mathematical relations. This duration has 
been programmed into FDS such that the fire develops and decays realistically. The burning duration was 
calculated using the following relations:  
Regression Rate of the Fuel: 
𝓋 =  
𝑚"
𝜌
 
Burning Duration: 
𝑡𝑏 =  
4𝑉
𝜋𝐷2𝓋
 
The results from each calculation are displayed in Table 7-6. 
Table 7-6: Calculated Burning Duration 
Volume of Fuel Spilled (ft3) Estimated Diameter (ft) Burning Duration (s) 
8.0 30.3 176 
7.4.6.3 Flame Spread Rate 
The temperature of the liquid relative to the liquids flashpoint is the single most important factor in 
determining the flame spread rate over the surface of a liquid. Most ignitions of flammable liquids can be 
characterized by one of two major flame spread mechanisms: liquid phase-controlled or gas phase-
controlled. Research and testing on small scale fires have shown that, during the gas phase-controlled 
state, the flame spread rate can be expected to be between 130-220 cm/s while liquid phase-controlled 
fires spread at roughly 1-12 cm/s [SFPE HB Chap 3-9].  
Generally, liquid fuel fires begin in the liquid phase-controlled state and transfer to the gas phase-
controlled state. This transfer happens as the fuel in front of the advancing fire reaches a temperature 
above its flashpoint. In some cases, the transfer to the gas phase-controlled state can happen almost 
instantaneously relative the duration of the fire. 
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For the purpose of this analysis, a flame spread rate of 1.35 m/s will be specified. This is chosen to create 
a conservative model, allowing the aircraft to be subjected to the effects of the fire for a greater period of 
time before the suppression system activates. Additionally, due to the relatively small size of the spill 
versus the spread rate of the fire, the overall time to full involvement of the fire could be considered 
negligible as the worst case scenario. Instead, a flame spread rate of 1.35 m/s has been assumed, which 
reaches a fully involved state 10 seconds after ignition. 
7.5 Fire Model Results  
The result of the fire model provide several key takeaways. The model was run for a total of 54 seconds 
due to logistical limitations. First, as expected, the heat release rate performed as specified as shown in 
Table 7-4.  
 
Figure 7-5: Heat Release Rate versus Time - FDS 
Both heat flux gas and temperature devices were located on the undersides of the aircraft fuselage and 
wing. The distribution of the sensors intended to show the fall off of the fire effects along the aircraft. The 
location of the sensors has been indicated in the diagram included in  
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Figure 7-6: Location of Heat Flux Gas and Temperature Sensor Devices 
An array of sensors were placed throughout the model to measure the surface temperature of the aircraft. 
These sensors, while heavily effected by turbulence within the model, indicate that the surface 
temperature of the aircraft will raise dramatically as the fire develops. A summary of the temperature 
measurements are included in Figure 7-7 
 
Figure 7-7: Temperature Sensor Measurements Located Under the Wing 
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The temperature on the underside of the wing decreases rapidly as turbulence within the model begins to 
hinder the fire and as conduction begins to spread the heat across the surface of the plane. Once a semi 
steady state is reached, the underside temperature of the wing measures between 100 °C and 125 °C 
throughout the remainder of the model. 
Temperatures were also measured along the fuselage as shown in Figure 7-8. 
 
Figure 7-8: Temperature Sensor Measurements Located Along Fuselage 
The fuselage of the aircraft is not immediately effected by the fire. However, throughout the duration of 
the scenario, the fuselage slowly heats reaching a peak heat of 98°C before the fire begins to decay.  
An array of sensors to record the radiative heat flux experienced by the aircraft were located in the same 
locations as the temperature sensors. These sensors, affected by the turbulence of the fire, indicate that a 
relatively high flux will be expected for a short period during the time the wing is engulfed by flames. 
The radiative heat flux on the surface of the aircraft rises rapidly as the fire develops and engulfs the 
wing. A large peak, shown in Figure 7-10, in radiative heat flux develops under the wing of the aircraft. 
This occurs approximately 12 seconds after the initiation of the model measures over 400 kW/m2. This 
rapid increase in flux deteriorates quickly trending to a steady state.  This pattern indicates that the wing 
will be subjected to a radiative heat flux averaging 40-50 kW/m2 throughout the course of the fire while 
the fuselage of the aircraft will only experience a radiative heat flux of 4-5 kW/m2.  
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The measured heat flux results located along the fuselage are included in Figure 7-9, while the heat flux 
results for the underwing measurements are included in Figure 7-10.
 
Figure 7-9: Heat Flux Gas Sensor Measurements Located Along Fuselage 
 
Figure 7-10: Heat Flux Gas Sensor Measurements Located Along Fuselage 
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7.6 Aircraft Protection Model Conclusions 
Given the performance criteria, the fire had a significant impact on the aircraft. Although sustained 
radiant heat fluxes of 90 kW/m2 were not reached, as the fire developed under the wing, the radiant flux 
and the surface temperatures on the underside of the wing elevated to a point in which total failure of the 
wing could occur. 
Both the wing and the body of the aircraft increase substantially. During the simulation, the surface 
temperature of the wing reaches temperatures approaching 100°C with the average surface temperatures 
of the fuselage not far behind. 
When factoring in the effects of the suppression system on the fire, it is unclear if the suppression systems 
would have an effective impact. From videos of final acceptance testing of the foam systems, foam 
solution usually begins discharging from the foam generators between 20 and 30 seconds. When 
incorporating the duration for activation along with the flow times for early suppression, foam does not 
flow from the generators until approximately 40 seconds after ignition. This allows for approximately 30 
seconds of unsuppressed fire exposure at 40-50 kW/m2 which could potentially cause yielding of the wing 
to occur.  
A final note: In this analysis some parameters were excluded. Particularly important is combustion of 
materials stored within the wings of the aircraft. Most aircraft utilize the space within the wing to store 
fuel in quantities greater than the quantity utilized in this scenario. If the fire causes the wing to fail or 
breaches the fuel container, the intensity of the fire can be greatly amplified. Due to this, it is important to 
protect the aircraft with a fast acting suppression system.  
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8.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Prescriptive Design Analysis Conclusions and Recommendations 
The 3-bay General Maintenance Hangar was evaluated and determined to comply with the prescriptive 
requirements of the UFC 3-600-01, DRAFT UFC 4-211-01, and applicable NFPA codes and standards  
A recommendation for the requirements of the new foam suppression system design requirements 
included in the DRAFT UFC 4-211-01, the USAF should consider allowing low-expansion trench drain 
foam nozzles instead of high expansion foam systems. These systems allow for a lesser pressure demand, 
greater operational flexibility with facility mission (i.e. airframe type) and provide foam coverage around 
the aircraft silhouette in a shorter time span.  
8.2 Performance Based Design Analysis Conclusions and Recommendations  
In summary, the design of the 3-bay general maintenance hangar was evaluated for two major 
performance objectives, Life safety and aircraft protection. Both performance objectives were analyzed 
against a pre-specified underwing fuel fire.  
The life safety analysis resulted in an available safe egress time of 224 seconds and a required safe egress 
time of 91 Seconds. Because the ASET is significantly greater than the RSET, the performance criteria 
has been considered as satisfied.  
The aircraft protection analysis yielded temperatures and heat flux measurements that could cause failure 
of the wing structure to occur prior to the release of the foam systems. This could potentially cause 
detrimental results to the rest of the aircraft and facility if failure of the wing structure introduces 
additional fuel to the fire.  
To better understand the effects of the large scale hydrocarbon fuel fires and their effects on aircraft, it is 
recommended that additional research be conducted on the subject. Ideally, a full scale test burn located 
in a hangar outfitted with a system designed per UFC 4-211-01 would provide a wealth of information on 
the effectiveness of these system. Additionally, this analysis would provide perspective on components of 
the system that could be revised or improved to increase the reliability of the system. 
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Subject Hydraulic Analysis Demand Draft UFC 4-211-01
     Date
     Calc by Z. Ataiyan
Known and Assumptions
● Design density of the sprinkler system is 0.2 gpm over the most demanding 5,000 sq.ft.
● The water supply is from dedicated tanks and pumps located in this building.
● Hose stream demand is provided by base domestic system and is not from the tanks and pumps.
● Calculation assumes a single KC-46 plane.
● Calculation covers both supply and demand requirements give PRV's on all riser with pump pressures over 175 psi.
● 8 Ansul Jet-X 27 foam generators were used in calculations.
Estimated Supply Water Requirements
NFPA 13 2010, para 8.2.1
NFPA 13 2010, para 8.2.1
NFPA 13 2010, para 8.2.1
UFC 3-600-01, Table 4-1
UFC 3-600-01, Table 4-1
ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.1.1.2
Wet-Pipe System Hydraulic Estimation
Design Density 0.20 gpm / sf
Design Area 5,000 sq ft
Flow Required 1,000 gpm
Increase Due to Flow Balancing 300 gpm
External Hose Stream Requirement (hydrant off separate water system) 0 gpm
Water Demand 1,300 gpm
Area of Coverage (per UFC 3-600-01 para 4-2.3.6) 130 sq ft
Design Density 0.20 gpm / sq ft
Minimum Head Flow 26 gpm
Minimum Head K-factor 5.6
Sprinkler Head Pressure Requirement (7.0 psi Minimum) 22 psi
● Each hangar bay is protected with a wet-pipe overhead sprinkler system and a high expansion foam system in accordance with  
ETL 02-15.
● Calculations show the minimum required preformance objectives of ETL 02-15 as modifed by direct request of AFCEC for 
several items from the 95% draft UFC 4-211-01.  
System Protection
52,000
Ordinary Hazard Group I
Light Hazard
Code Reference
(sq ft)
System Protection Area Limitations
0.20
52,000
Density
1,500
Area
3,000 500
Hose Stream
52,000
Design Design
Light Hazard (HC-1) 250
Ordinary Hazard (HC-2)
Ordinary Hazard Group II
(gpm/sq ft) (sq ft)
0.10
(gpm)
0.20
5,000
Code Reference
Allowance
Occupancy Classification
Hangar Wet System 500
Subject Hydraulic Analysis Demand Draft UFC 4-211-01
     Date
     Calc by Z. Ataiyan
From Remote Area to Bottom of Hangar Wet-Pipe Riser
Flow Requirement for Remote Area 1,300 gpm
Sprinkler Head Elevation 98 ft aff
Bottom of Wet-pipe Riser Elevation 2 ft aff
Height Difference 97 ft
Pressure Requirement 42 psi
Losses for Branchline (Estimated) 15 psi
Linear Feet of pipe from Sprinkler Head to Base of Riser 450 ft
Estimated Fitting Equivalent Length (100%) 450 ft
Total Equivalent Piping from Sprinkler Head to Bottom of Riser 900 ft
8" Inside Pipe Diameter 8 in
C-factor for Schedule 40 Black Wet Pipe 120
Pressure Loss Per Foot (Hazen-Williams) 0 psi / ft
Pressure Loss of Pipe from Sprinkler Head to Bottom of Riser 14 psi
Velocity in Pipe 8 fps
Pressure loss through 6" Riser Check Valve 2 psi
Remote Area Summary for Wet-Pipe System
Flow Requirement for Design Area 1,300 gpm
Pressure Requirement at Bottom of Riser 93 psi
External Hose Stream Requirement 0 gpm
Hi-Ex Foam Hydraulic Estimation
Minimum Generator Flow 181 gpm
Minimum Generator Pressure 40 psi
Generator K Factor 28.6
Subject Hydraulic Analysis Demand Draft UFC 4-211-01
     Date
     Calc by Z. Ataiyan
Pi
pe
 D
ia
m
et
er
Fl
ow
 A
dd
ed
To
ta
l F
lo
w
Pi
pe
 C
 - 
fa
ct
or
Fr
ic
tio
n 
lo
ss
/fo
ot
Fi
tti
ng
s
Eq
ui
va
le
nt
 L
en
gt
h 
Fi
tti
ng
s
As
su
m
ed
 F
itt
in
gs
 
Eq
ui
va
le
nt
 L
en
gt
h 
(5
0%
)
Pi
pe
 L
en
gt
h
Fr
ic
tio
n 
Lo
ss
 O
ve
r 
Se
gm
en
t
El
ev
at
io
n 
R
is
e
To
ta
l P
re
ss
ur
e
Ve
lo
ct
iy
 A
ct
ua
l
St
ar
t P
re
ss
ur
e
G1 + branch 2.469 190 190 120 0.130 3ET 30 33 8.2 6.0 54.8 12.7 44.0
G2 + branch 2.469 206 206 120 0.151 3ET 30 5 5.3 0.0 57.3 13.8 52.0
G3 + branch 2.469 206 206 120 0.151 3ET 30 46 11.4 -10.0 59.1 13.8 52.0
G4 + branch 2.469 208 208 120 0.153 3ET 30 5 5.4 0.0 58.4 13.9 53.0
G5 + branch 2.469 183 183 120 0.121 3ET 30 5 4.2 0.0 45.2 12.3 41.0
G6 + branch 2.469 181 181 120 0.119 3ET 30 31 7.2 7.0 50.3 12.1 40.0
G7 + branch 2.469 196 196 120 0.137 3ET 30 5 4.8 0.0 51.8 13.1 47.0
G8 + branch 2.469 203 203 120 0.147 3ET 30 10 5.9 -2.0 55.0 13.6 50.0
T5 to T6 2.469 183 183 120 0.121 43 5.2 0.0 50.4 12.3
T6 to T7 3.068 181 364 120 0.150 7 1.0 0.0 51.5 15.8
T7 to T8 4.026 196 560 120 0.089 45 4.0 0.0 55.5 14.1
T8 to T9 6.065 203 763 120 0.021 E 15 67 1.7 10.0 61.5 8.5
T1 to T2 3.068 190 190 120 0.045 53 2.4 0.0 57.2 8.2
T2 to T3 4.026 206 396 120 0.047 35 1.6 0.0 58.8 10.0
T3 to T4 4.026 206 602 120 0.101 1 0.1 0.0 58.9 15.2
T4 to T9 6.065 208 810 120 0.024 T 30 76 2.5 0.0 61.4 9.0
T9 to RED 6.065 763 1573 120 0.081 63 125 15.2 45.0 96.1 17.5
RED to BOR 7.981 0 1573 120 0.021 28 55 1.8 7.0 100.9 10.1
Inductor 8" 35% per manufacture 0.0 155.3
Deluge Valve/PRV 6" Chart 10.0 0.0 165.3
BOR to PUMP 11.938 1300 2873 120 0.009 153 305 4.2 3.0 170.8 8.2
Strainer 12" Chart 2.0 0.0 172.8
PUMP to TANK 20.750 0 2873 140 0.000 175 370 0.3 0.0 173.0 2.7
PUMP 0 2873 Chart -202.0
Pressure Required at Tank -29.0
Safety margin 29.0 psi
16.7%
Subject Foam Calculation Demand Draft UFC 4-211-01
     Date
     Calc by Z. Ataiyan
Checked by
Service Floor Area (A) sq ft
Depth (D) 3.2 ft Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.2.2
Submergence Volume (V = A x D) cu ft Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1
Submergence Time (T) 4 min Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1
Breakdown from Sprinkler Discharge (S) 10 cfm/gpm Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1
Wet Sprinkler Density 0.20 gpm/sq ft Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.1.1.2
Design Area 5,000 sq ft Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.1.1.2
Estimated Flow Rate 1,000 gpm
Increase due to Balancing 1,300 gpm
Estimated Sprinkler Discharge (Q) 1,300 gpm
Rate of Foam Break Down (Rs = S x Q) cfm Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1
Compensation for Foam Shrinkage (Cn) 1.15 Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1
Compensation for Leakage (Cl) 3.0 Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1
Minimum rate of Discharge: R = ((V/T) + Rs) x Cn x Cl Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3.1
Minimum Rate of Discharge (R) cfm
Minimum Rate of Discharge (R) cfm
Service Floor Area (A) sq ft
Rate of Discharge (minimum 2.6 cfm/sq ft) 3.70 cfm/sq ft Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.3
Quantity of Hi-Ex Foam Generators
Minimum Rate of Discharge (R) cfm
Number of Foam Generators 8
Minimum Average Discharge Rate cfm
Foam Generator Manufacturer Ansul
Model Selected JET-X-27
Output Gen 1 cfm
Output Gen 2 cfm
Output Gen 3 cfm
Output Gen 4 cfm
Output Gen 5 cfm
21,763
24,232
22,031
176,245
176,245
47,607
176,245
This sheet calculates the foam requirements per ETL 02-15.
47,607
152,342
13,000
24,232
24,366
20,662
Output Gen 6 cfm
Output Gen 7 cfm
Output Gen 8 cfm Total cfm
Size of Bladder Tank
Discharge Duration 15 min Per ETL 02-15, Para A1.3.3.4
Calculated Foam Solution Flow gpm
Total Estimated Volume of Solution gal
Amount of 2.0% Concentrate 472 gal
23,595
1,573
182,379
22,864
20,295
23,965
Subject Foam Spread Calculations Draft UFC 4-211-01
     Date
     Calc by Z. Ataiyan 
This sheet estimates the amount of coverage in one minute at each generator.  This is done to 
verify 90% coverage of the plane silhouette can be covered in less than one minute in accordance with 
ETL 02-15 para A1.3.3.2.1. See accompanying plans showing compliance.
For Generator 1
Fire Alarm 0.0 sec
Trip Deluge Valve 2.0 sec 2.0 sec
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED 10.1 fps 55 ft 5.4 sec 7.4 sec
Water Flow from RED to T9 17.5 fps 125 ft 7.1 sec 14.6 sec
Water Flow from T9 to T4 9.0 fps 76 ft 8.4 sec 23.0 sec
Water Flow from T4 to T3 15.2 fps 1 ft 0.1 sec 23.1 sec
Water Flow from T3 to T2 10.0 fps 35 ft 3.5 sec 26.6 sec
Water Flow from T2 to T1 8.2 fps 53 ft 6.5 sec 33.1 sec
Water Flow from T1 to G1 12.7 fps 33 ft 2.6 sec 35.7 sec
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor 61 ft 4.1 sec 39.7 sec
Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor 20.3 sec
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps 20.3 ft
Diameter of Foam Coverage 40.5 ft
For Generator 2
Fire Alarm 0.0 sec
Trip Deluge Valve 2.0 sec 2.0 sec
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED 10.1 fps 55 ft 5.4 sec 7.4 sec
Water Flow from RED to T9 17.5 fps 125 ft 7.1 sec 14.6 sec
Water Flow from T9 to T4 9.0 fps 76 ft 8.4 sec 23.0 sec
Water Flow from T4 to T3 15.2 fps 1 ft 0.1 sec 23.1 sec
Water Flow from T3 to T2 10.0 fps 35 ft 3.5 sec 26.6 sec
Water Flow from T2 to G2 13.8 fps 5 ft 0.4 sec 27.0 sec
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor 55 ft 3.7 sec 30.6 sec
Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor 29.4 sec
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps 29.4 ft
Diameter of Foam Coverage 58.7 ft
For Generator 3
Fire Alarm 0.0 sec
Trip Deluge Valve 2.0 sec 2.0 sec
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED 10.1 fps 55 ft 5.4 sec 7.4 sec
Water Flow from RED to T9 17.5 fps 125 ft 7.1 sec 14.6 sec
Velocity Length Total
From the preliminary hydraulic calculations, the velocity along each pipe length to each generator is known.  
These velocities, along with deluge valve releasing time, and falling foam time are used to estimate the foam 
coverage across the hangar floor at the end of one minute.  This methodology is known to be conservative as 
the filling velocity of the empty pipe is faster than the stabilized water flow. 
Velocity Length Total
Velocity Length Total
Subject Foam Spread Calculations Draft UFC 4-211-01
     Date
     Calc by Z. Ataiyan 
Water Flow from T9 to T4 9.0 fps 76 ft 8.4 sec 23.0 sec
Water Flow from T4 to T3 15.2 fps 1 ft 0.1 sec 23.1 sec
Water Flow from T3 to G3 13.8 fps 46 ft 3.3 sec 26.4 sec
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor 45 ft 3.0 sec 29.4 sec
Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor 30.6 sec
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps 30.6 ft
Diameter of Foam Coverage 61.1 ft
For Generator 4
Fire Alarm 0.0 sec
Trip Deluge Valve 2.0 sec 2.0 sec
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED 10.1 fps 55 ft 5.4 sec 7.4 sec
Water Flow from RED to T9 17.5 fps 125 ft 7.1 sec 14.6 sec
Water Flow from T9 to T4 9.0 fps 76 ft 8.4 sec 23.0 sec
Water Flow from T4 to G4 13.9 fps 5 ft 0.4 sec 23.4 sec
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor 55 ft 3.7 sec 27.1 sec
Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor 32.9 sec
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps 32.9 ft
Diameter of Foam Coverage 65.9 ft
For Generator 5
Fire Alarm 0.0 sec
Trip Deluge Valve 2.0 sec 2.0 sec
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED 10.1 fps 55 ft 5.4 sec 7.4 sec
Water Flow from RED to T9 17.5 fps 125 ft 7.1 sec 14.6 sec
Water Flow from T9 to T8 8.5 fps 67 ft 7.9 sec 22.5 sec
Water Flow from T8 to T7 14.1 fps 45 ft 3.2 sec 25.7 sec
Water Flow from T7 to T6 15.8 fps 7 ft 0.4 sec 26.1 sec
Water Flow from T6 to T5 12.3 fps 43 ft 3.5 sec 29.6 sec
Water Flow from T5 to G5 12.3 fps 5 ft 0.4 sec 30.0 sec
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor 63 ft 4.2 sec 34.2 sec
Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor 25.8 sec
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps 25.8 ft
Diameter of Foam Coverage 51.6 ft
For Generator 6 sec
Fire Alarm 0.0 sec
Trip Deluge Valve 2.0 sec 2.0 sec
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED 10.1 fps 55 ft 5.4 sec 7.4 sec
Water Flow from RED to T9 17.5 fps 125 ft 7.1 sec 14.6 sec
Water Flow from T9 to T8 8.5 fps 67 ft 7.9 sec 22.5 sec
Water Flow from T8 to T7 14.1 fps 45 ft 3.2 sec 25.7 sec
Velocity Length Total
Velocity Length Total
Velocity Length Total
Subject Foam Spread Calculations Draft UFC 4-211-01
     Date
     Calc by Z. Ataiyan 
Water Flow from T7 to T6 15.8 fps 7 ft 0.4 sec 26.1 sec
Water Flow from T6 to G6 12.1 fps 31 ft 2.6 sec 28.7 sec
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor 70 ft 4.7 sec 33.3 sec
Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor 26.7 sec
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps 26.7 ft
Diameter of Foam Coverage 53.3 ft
For Generator 7
Fire Alarm 0.0 sec
Trip Deluge Valve 2.0 sec 2.0 sec
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED 10.1 fps 55 ft 5.4 sec 7.4 sec
Water Flow from RED to T9 17.5 fps 125 ft 7.1 sec 14.6 sec
Water Flow from T9 to T8 8.5 fps 67 ft 7.9 sec 22.5 sec
Water Flow from T8 to T7 14.1 fps 45 ft 3.2 sec 25.7 sec
Water Flow from T7 to G7 13.1 fps 5 ft 0.4 sec 26.0 sec
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor 63 ft 4.2 sec 30.2 sec
Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor 29.8 sec
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps  29.8 ft
Diameter of Foam Coverage 59.5 ft
For Generator 8
Fire Alarm 0.0 sec
Trip Deluge Valve 2.0 sec 2.0 sec
Water Flow from Deluge Valve to RED 10.1 fps 55 ft 5.4 sec 7.4 sec
Water Flow from RED to T9 17.5 fps 125 ft 7.1 sec 14.6 sec
Water Flow from T9 to T8 8.5 fps 67 ft 7.9 sec 22.5 sec
Water Flow from T8 to G8 13.6 fps 10 ft 0.7 sec 23.2 sec
Duration for Foam to Reach the Floor 61 ft 4.1 sec 27.3 sec
Duration of Foam Coverage on the Floor 32.7 sec
Radius of Foam Coverage Assumed 1 fps 32.7 ft
Diameter of Foam Coverage 65.5 ft
Velocity Length Total
Velocity Length Total
  
 – FIRE SUPPRESSION DRAWINGS AND CALCULATIONS 
This is not releasable in accordance with FOIA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption (b)(4) refers 
to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DoD Component receives 
from a person or organization outside the Government with the understanding that the 
information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential basis in accordance with the 
customary handling of such records.  
  
 – FIRE ALARM DRAWINGS AND CALCULATIONS 
This is not releasable in accordance with FOIA exemption (b)(4). FOIA exemption (b)(4) refers 
to those trade secrets or commercial or financial information that a DoD Component receives 
from a person or organization outside the Government with the understanding that the 
information or record will be retained on a privileged or confidential basis in accordance with the 
customary handling of such records.  
  
 – ENGINEERING WEATHER DATA 
  
 – ASET VERSUS RSET CALCULATIONS 
Available Safe Egress Time Calculation
• NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2015 Edition. 
• SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition (SFPE HB)
Egress Analysis:
• Single story aircraft hangar bay containing 47,709 SF of contigous open space.
• The eave and peak heights of the ceiling exist at 50 ft and 98 ft above the hangar floor, respectively
• The fire will initiate under the left wing and will consist of a burning 60 gallon fuel spill.
• The fire will be unhindered by the suppression system and will prodice an axisymmetric plume
• The ceiling height used will be the mean ceiling height of the structure: 74 ft
Calculated Peak HRR 147300 kW
Time to Peak HRR 10 s
Smoke Fill: SFPE Handbook (3rd Ed) Section 3 Chapter 9 Page 3-259
74.0 ft
22.6 m
sq ft
4,432 m²
0.064 m4/3/kW1/3-s
kW/s2
2
Smoke Layer Height for Tenability Limit (ZL) 1.83 m
6.0 ft
224 sec
3.7 min
Time to Reach Tenability Limit (t)
Smoke Filling:
Height of Hangar Bay Ceiling (H)
Hangar Bay Area (As) 47,709
Volumetric Entrainment Coefficient (Kv)
Fire Growth Coefficient (αn) 1,473.0
Coefficient for Fire Growth (T-Squared Fire) (n)
Design Fire:
The design fire is located in hangar bay 3. For the configuration of this 60 gallon fuel spill, the calculated peak 
heat release rate is 147.3 MW. 
Purpose:
The purpose of this calculation is to demonstrate occupants within Hangary Bay 3 can safely egress from the 
building during a fire incident before untenable conditions are achieved, without the need for smoke/heat vents.  
This calculation compares the smoke filling time due to a 60 gallon hydrocarbon fuel spill pool fire to the 
estimated egress time from the facility. As shown below, the smoke layer descends to a height of 6 ft (1.83 m) 
above the hangar floor 224 seconds after ignition.
References:
Known:
Assumptions:
Required Safe Egress Time Calculation
• NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2015 Edition. 
• SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition (SFPE HB)
Egress Analysis:
• Single story aircraft hangar bay containing 47,709 SF of contigous open space.
• There are nine exits out of the hangar bay.
•
•
•
•
Time to Egress Through the Exit
96
12
8
24
Egress Door Clear Width 33.5
Flow Rate Through Each Exit 67
Time Required For People Cued at the Door to Pass through Exit 7
Time to Reach the Exit:
250 ft
235 ft/min
64 sec
The occupant density is based on the maximum expected occupant loading for each area in 
acccordance with NFPA 101, Sec 5.4.5.4.
Maximum Travel Distance
Maximum Exit Flow Speed (SFPE HB Table 3-13.4)
Travel Time to Reach the Exit
Because the time to reach the exit is less then the time it takes for people to exit through the door, cueing will 
occur at the door.  Therefore the time it takes 8 people to exit through a single door becomes the most 
restrictive egress component during the movement phase.  The total expected egress time is calculated as 
follows:
sec
Occupant Load in the space people
Number of Available Exits  
Occupant Load per Exit people
Maximum Specific Flow Through a Door (SFPE HB Table 3-13.5) people/min/ft
of eff width
in
people/min
Assumptions:
From the initiation of the fire, it is assumed there will be 10 seconds before the fire is observed by the 
optical flame detectors and 10 seconds of premovement upon alarm before occupant evacuation.  
Therefore from the initiation of the fire, it is assumed 20 seconds will pass before occupant movement 
begins. These premovement durations are based on SFPE HB 12-3 for buildings with occupants 
trained in fire evacuation.
Only occupants in Hangar Bay 3 will be egressing through the Hangar Bay. Occupants in the other 
hangar bays and support spaces will utilizes their nearest exit. All occupants will use all exits equally, 
and occupants will begin egress at the same time.
Total Square Footage in Hangar Bay 47,709 sq ft
Purpose:
The purpose of this calculation is to demonstrate occupants within the hangar bay can safely egress from the 
building during a fire incident before untenable conditions are achieved, without the need for smoke/heat 
vents.  This calculation compares the smoke filling time due to several stacks of burning pallets to the 
estimated egress time from the facility. As shown below, the allotted egress time of 1.5 minutes is well within 
the 3.7 minutes needed for the smoke layer to approach the tenebility limit of 6 ft as addressed in the ASET 
Calculation.  
References:
Known:
Although the actual maximum travel distance from Hangar Bay 3 is less than the maximum allowable 
travel distance per the NFPA 101 Sec 7.6, the maximum allowable travel distance will be used for this 
calculation.
Required Safe Egress Time Calculation
Time Until the Fire is Observed 10 sec
Premovement Delay 10 sec
Movement/Cueing 71 sec
Total time to Egress 91 sec
1.5 min
Smoke Fill: SFPE Handbook (3rd Ed) Section 3 Chapter 9 Page 3-259
•
•
•
74 ft
22.6 m
sq ft
4,432 m²
0.064 m4/3/kW1/3-s
kW/s2
91 sec
2
Smoke Layer Height at Completion of Egress 8.3 m
27.1 ft
Conclusion:
This calculation uses the formulas from SFPE HB which have been derived from testing of occupant 
movement and smoke development.  From the calculation above, it is expected occupants from the factory 
floor will have completely evacuated the building 91 seconds after the initiation of the fire.  Based on the heat 
release rate of the design fire, it is expected the smoke layer will decend to a height of 27.1 ft above the 
finished floor by the time the last person exits the hangar bay. This limitation is well above the tenable limit of 
6 ft. Therefore due to the large smoke filling area, smoke/heat vents are not required to maintain tenable 
egress conditions during a fire event.
Smoke Filling:
The smoke layer interface is determined using equation 40 from the SFPE HB Section 3 Chapter 9 below.  
This equation determines the smoke layer interface during the development of the t-squared fire.  Per the 
calculations above, the occupants in the building will have safety egressed 91 seconds (1.5 min) after fire 
initiation. The equation below will determine the smoke layer interface at 91 seconds.
Height of Hangar Bay Ceiling (H)
Hangar Bay Area (As) 47,709
Volumetric Entrainment Coefficient (Kv)
Fire Growth Coefficient (αn) 1,410.0
Time when all Occupants Have Egressed from Hangar Bay 3 (t)
Coefficient for Fire Growth (T-Squared Fire) (n)
Assume:
The smoke filling is based on the methods used in the ASET calculations previously discussed in this 
analysis. Refer to the Available Safe Egress Time Calculations for a full list of assumptions.
The tenability limit is based on 6 ft above the highest occupiable level on the hangar bay per NFPA 
101 Section 5.2.
All smoke produced by the design fire is contained within the compartment, no leakage.
  
 – DESIGN FIRE CALCULATIONS 
  
Peak Heat Release Rate and Burning Duration
Knowns and Assumptions
•
• The geometry of the fuel spill is not influenced by the incline of the hangar floor. 
• The fuel spill spreads in a radially uniform manner, forming an approximate square geometry
• At the time of ignition, the fuel is stagnant.
Quantity of JP-8 Fuel
Quantity of Fuel Spilled 60 Gallons
Volume of Fuel Spilled 8.02 ft3
Thickness of settled fuel spill [Spills on Flat Inclined Surfaces, PNNL] 0.011155 ft
Width of Fuel Spill Area (W) 27 ft
Length of Fuel Spilled (L) 27 ft
Surface Area of JP-8 Fuel Spill 719 ft2
JP-8 Fuel Parameters
Heat of Combustion 43240 kJ/kg
Auto-Ignition Temperature 238 °C
Mass Loss Rate 0.0510 kg/m2·s
Extinction-Absorbtion Coefficient 3.60 1/m
Fire Diameter 9.22 m
Fuel Density 805 kg/m3
This calculation determines the fuel spill surface area, peak heat release rate, and burning duration for a 60 gallon pool 
fire in a large aircraft general maintenance hangar.
JP-8 Fuel is spilled in the hangar bay as shown below.
Peak Heat Release Rate and Burning Duration
Heat Release Rate of the Fire [SFPE Handbook (4th Ed.) Section 3, Chapter 1]
Peak Heat Release Rate 147.3 MW
Burning Duration 54 Seconds
Vol 0.2271251 m3
A m2
D
Flame Height and Radiant Heat Flux Calculation
Knowns and Assumptions
•
A #REF! m2
Flame Height (Heskestad correlation) D
Peak Heat Release Rate, Q 147313 kW
Fire Diameter, D 9.22 m
Flame Height, H 18.03 m
Fire Origin (Center Point)
X: 19.3
Y: 30.4
Z: 9.0
Location of Sensor
X: 29.8
Y: 34.0
Z: 3.6
Distance Between Points (in X,Y,Z Coordinates), L 12.3 m
Screening Methods - Shokri and Beyler
Radiant Heat Flux, 9.7 kW/m2
Screening Methods - Point Source Model
Total Radiative Energy output from the Fire, Qr 26317 kW
Angle Between Target and P, θ 26.1 degrees
Distance from the point source to the Target, R 12.3 m
Radiant Heat Flux, 7.8 kW/m2
JP-8 Fuel is spilled in the hangar bay as shown in the previous calculation.
This calculation determines the flame height and incidental radiant heat fluxes for a 60 gallon pool fire in a large aircraft 
general maintenance hangar. The radiant flux will be determined using several screening and detailed methods from 
SFPE HB Chapter 3-10.
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Flame Height and Radiant Heat Flux Calculation
Detailed Methods - Shokri and Beyler
S 2.67 h 3.91
A 4.386 B 1.522
Horizontal Configuration Factor, F12,H 0.18
Vertical Configuration Factor, F12,V 0.36
Maximum Configuration Factor, F12,max 0.40
Effective Emmisive Power, E 48.70 kW/m2
Radiant Heat Flux, 19.7 kW/m2
Summary
 
Device Shokri & Beyler CorrelationPoint Source ModelShokri & Beyler Model
Fuselage Sensor 1 7.3 3.1 24.2
Fuselage Sensor 2 9.8 -7.8 19.6
Fuselage Sensor 3 11.2 12.9 17.9
Fuselage Sensor 4 10.2 -2.5 19.1
Fuselage Sensor 5 7.9 -3.7 23.0
Wing Sensor 1 10.2 -2.0 19.0
Wing Sensor 2 9.7 7.8 19.7
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